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Although competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs ') collectively
have gained considerable market share since the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, many entrants into local
telecommunications have stumbled or failed. Some argue that competitive
local telephony will eventuate only if the incumbent local exchange
carriers ("ILECs") place their wholesale and retail operations in
structurally separate subsidiaries. By mid-2001, several states began
proceedings on mandatory structural separation, and influential members
of Congress introduced legislation mandating structural separation. In
this Article, we analyze, and reject as unpersuasive, the putative benefits of
mandatory structural separation. Such regulatory intervention is
unnecessary to prevent discrimination against unaffiliated retailers of
telecommunications services. Nor would mandatory structural separation
lower wholesale discounts or increase the CLECs' market share. Plausible
hypotheses for the CLECs' problems do not require the assumption of
anticompetitive behavior by the ILECs. Apart from producing no
discernable benefits to consumers, mandatory structural separation would
entail a substantial social cost in terms of forgone coordination of
investment and production and forgone economies of scope. Moreover,
mandatory structural separation would harm consumer welfare and
reduce resources for investment by facilitating an anticompetitive strategy
by the ILECs' largest rivals to raise the ILECs' costs of providing local
telecommunications services. Policy makers should reject proposals for
mandatory structural separation of the ILECs.
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Introduction
When Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, it said
that the legislation's purpose was to "promote competition and reduce
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications technologies."1 Half a dozen years
have now passed, The vision held by some of a radically different market
structure for local telecommunications has thus far failed to materialize.
Collectively, competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs") are gaining
market share and accounted for 9.0% of switched-access lines in the
United States as of June 30, 2001.2 The New York Public Service
Commission has reported that as of December 31, 2000, CLECs supplied
2.9 million lines in that state, for a market share of 20.9%. 3 For the first
time, more CLEC lines (52%) served residences than businesses (48%) in
New York.4 Still, many entrants into the market for telecommunications
have gone bankrupt or lost a substantial fraction of their market
capitalization, and many telecommunications carriers now face substantial
debt burdens.5 Between the fourth quarter of 1999 and the fourth quarter of
I Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, preamble, 110 Stat. 56.
2 Federal Communications Commission, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June
30, 2001 (2002) [hereinafter Local Telephone Competition Update].
3 New York State Public Service Commission, Analysis of Local Exchange Service
Competition in New York State 3 (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/telecom/
telanalysis.htm.
4 Id. at4.
5 See, e.g., Drowning in Glass: The Fibre-Optic Glut: Can You Have too Much of a Good
Thing? The History of Technology Says Not, but that was Before the Fibre-Optic Bubble, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 24, 2001, at *1 (documenting ratio of debt to market capitalization); Gregory Zuckerman &
Deborah Soloman, Telecom Debt Debacle Could Lead to Losses of Historic Proportions, WALL ST. J.,
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2001, at least twelve publicly traded CLECs experienced negative growth
in earnings, and many filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection,
including WinStar, Northpoint, ICG, Covad, and Net2000.6
The competing explanations for the difficulties encountered by many
CLECs are numerous. In particular, however, some argue that the current
regulatory strategy (or the current path of "managed competition" adopted
in lieu of true deregulation7) is not enough and that competitive local
telephony will eventuate only if regulators require the incumbent local
exchange carriers ("ILECs") to place their wholesale and retail operations
in structurally separate subsidiaries. In February 2001, the chairman of
AT&T, C. Michael Armstrong, publicly advocated such intervention by
state or federal regulators or by Congress.' By the summer of 2001,
regulators in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Florida had considered or
begun proceedings on the subject, 9 and Senator Ernest F. Hollings,
chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, had introduced the
Telecommunications Competition Enforcement Act of 2001, a bill that
would mandate structural separation of the ILECs. 10
Structural separation is also becoming an issue of international
importance. For example, in Japan, the new CLECs are demanding the full
structural separation of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. ("NTT")
even though the firm's mobile services operations were divested in 1992
and its remaining operations were forcibly reorganized under a holding
May 11, 2001, at Al. Manufacturers of telecommunications equipment have suffered similar losses in
market value. Two of the largest suppliers, Alcatel and Lucent, explored plans to merge in May 2001
due to the downturn in demand for telecommunications equipment, but they ultimately rejected a
merger. See Nikhil Deogun, et al., Alcatel Nears Deal to Acquire Lucent For About $23.5 Billion in
Stock, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2001, at A3; Greg Schneider & William Drozdiak, Lucent Merger Talks
Collapse, WASH. POST, May 30, 2001, at El.
6 See, e.g., GST TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC., 1999 SEC FORM 10-K (Mar. 29, 2000); Yuki
Noguchi, Rising Up to the Challenge: 4 Upstart Telecom Companies Are Picking Up Where the Bells
Left Off, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2001, at G14; Covad Makes Filing in Bankruptcy Court in Bondholder
Deal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2001, at B2.
7 Managed competition, sometimes called "asymmetric regulation" or "dominant carrier
regulation," places larger relative regulatory obligations on the incumbent firm. See J. Gregory Sidak
& Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON
REG. 117 (1998); Robert W. Crandall, Managed Competition in U.S. Telecommunications (AEI-
Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 99-01, Mar. 1999).
8 Speech of C. Michael Armstrong, National Press Club, Feb. 7, 2001, at
http://www.att.com/speeches/item/0,1363,3662,00.html.
9 Global Order of Structural Separation of Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., Retail and
Wholesale Operations, Dkt. Nos. P-00991648, P-00991649, at 222, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Sept. 30,
1999 [hereinafter Pennsylvania Global Order]; Petition of AT&T Communications of the Southern
States, Inc., TCG South Florida, and MediaOne Florida Telecommunications, Inc., for Structural
Separation of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., Dkt. No. 010345-TP, Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
Mar. 21, 2001; Request for Proposal to Conduct a Comprehensive Review of the Financial Integrity of
Verizon New Jersey, Dkt. No. TO01020095, N.J. Bd. Pub. Util., May 8, 2001.
10 S. 1364, 107th Cong. (2001).
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company structure in July 1999." Under the terms of the government-
mandated restructuring, NTT's long distance service became NTT
Communications Corp. and its local service was divided to form the
regional carriers NTT East and NTT West. 2 NTT remained as the holding
company of its newly-created subsidiaries, but was prevented from cross-
subsidizing the losses of any subsidiary with earnings from other
subsidiaries. 13 Now, NTT faces the possibility of full divestiture, despite
the fact that the regional carriers had negative earnings in 2001.14
Part I examines AT&T's hypothesis for failing CLECs and its
proposal for mandatory structural separation. According to AT&T,
anticompetitive behavior by the ILECs caused the CLECs to fail.
Ostensibly to prevent discrimination against nonaffiliated retailers of local
service, AT&T and some other CLECs urge regulators to separate
structurally the ILECs into wholesale and retail companies. According to
its proponents, structural separation would "level the playing field"' 5
between nonaffiliated local retail providers and the ILECs.
In Part II, we critique AT&T's diagnosis of local competition and its
accompanying structural solution. Anticompetitive practices cannot
explain certain market and regulatory phenomena. Despite allegations of
anticompetitive practices by the ILECs, some CLECs are thriving. Indeed,
we demonstrate that CLECs' market share has steadily increased between
1998 and 2002. Moreover, during the same time period, state regulators
have approved the entry of regional Bell operating companies ("RBOCs")
into long-distance services-an event that is not consistent with
anticompetitive behavior. Next, we argue that mandatory structural
separation is inefficient. Its likely costs would exceed any purported
benefits. In particular, we examine several potential efficiency gains
associated with vertical integration, including, among others, the
coordination of investment and production decisions, accountability for
product quality, and the ability to make bundled service offerings.
11 Glossary of Deregulation, NIKKEINET INTERACTIVE, at http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/
(Mar. 16, 2002) (hereinafter Glossary of Deregulation].
12 Id.; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, STRUCTURAL
SEPARATION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES, 160, tbl.A-8 (Apr. 10, 2001) (noting that NTT was forced
to divest its mobile operation to form NTT DoCoMo, although NTT retained 94.7% ownership in the
new company at the time of divestiture) [hereinafter OECD].
13 Glossary of Deregulation, supra note 11.
14 Id.
15 The "level playing field" is the most overused and ambiguous clich6 in the regulation of
network industries (if not all economic policy). To the extent that the clich6 connotes the assurance of
an equality of outcomes among rival firms, we thoroughly reject it as a proper goal of regulation. The
clichd is a useful and proper goal of regulation only to the extent that it focuses on consumer welfare
(not competitor welfare) and connotes the elimination of regulatory barriers that would otherwise deny
certain rivals an equal opportunity to compete.
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Mandatory structural separation would jeopardize each of these
efficiencies. We conclude Part II by explaining why mandatory structural
separation is not an efficacious remedy under any diagnosis of the CLECs'
problems. First, there is no systematic evidence of discrimination. Second,
behavioral restraints could prevent discrimination. Third, mandatory
structural separation would not lower wholesale discounts to CLECs.
Fourth, the experience with structural separation in several other contexts
has been unsatisfactory or inconclusive.
In Part IlI of this Article, we suggest that faulty business strategies are
to blame for many CLEC failures. Our hypothesis is consistent with
empirical evidence that, despite the massive shakeout in the
telecommunications sector, some CLECs have actually prospered. Next,
we provide anecdotal and empirical evidence that supports our hypothesis.
In particular, we review the business strategies of several CLECs and then
correlate those strategies with success or failure. Entrants that deliberately
built their own networks, carefully analyzing competition and consumer
demand before entry, were able to increase revenues and continue to
attract capital. An overly generous unbundling regime that rewards CLECs
for deferring investment might be at the root of the CLECs' problems.
Part IV explains how mandatory structural separation can serve an
ulterior motive: It can advance an anticompetitive strategy of AT&T and
others to raise the ILECs' costs of providing local telecommunications
services. This strategy of raising rivals' costs would ultimately increase
costs for consumers and reduce investment.
We conclude with the recommendation that policy makers reject
proposals for mandatory structural separation of the ILECs.
I. AT&T's Hypothesis for Failing CLECs and Its Call for Mandatory
Structural Separation
The phrase "structural separation" has come to have many meanings.
Different meanings of the term, however, have different policy
implications. In general, there are three different understandings of
structural separation. The first type is the divestiture of the retail service
division from the wholesale network division. Under the second form of
structural separation, one company owns and operates the
telecommunications network while other companies actually provide the
service to end users. The third form, functional separation, requires the
ILEC to form separate divisions that interact at arm's length. We explore
the meaning of mandatory structural separation and lay out its purported
merits.
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AT&T and CompTel, a trade association of CLECs, have advanced a
hypothesis to explain the failure of several CLECs. In the Sections that
follow, we explain their hypothesis and their proposed remedy-
mandatory structural separation of the ILECs.
A. The Allegation that Anticompetitive Behavior by the ILECs Caused
the CLECs to Fail
AT&T and several CLEC associations blame the failure of several
CLECs on allegedly anticompetitive practices of the ILECs. In a July 2001
study commissioned by CompTel, the trade association attempted to link
the industry shakeout with the self-interested practices of the ILECs:
Opening the local network to competitors is unquestionably complex, but
the magnitude of the problem has grown exponentially because the entity
responsible for implementing nondiscriminatory access is itself the sole
beneficiary of the exclusive access that exists today. The past five years
have shown that attempting to overcome these incentives through a series
of regulatory orders-reached only at the conclusion of protracted and
expensive litigation-is not producing the necessary results.
Indeed, the competitive sector of the telecommunications industry
is in serious jeopardy as several CLECs have declared bankruptcy,
missed revenue targets, curtailed entry into new markets and laid off
employees. Moreover, these impacts are not limited to CLECs (and their
customers); these effects are also being felt upstream with the
manufacturers of telecommunications equipment themselves.
16
CompTel also pointed to the ILECs' failure to enter out-of-territory local
markets as "the most telling evidence that substantial barriers remain to
local competition.'
17
The specific allegations of anticompetitive behavior by ILECs fall
into two broad categories: preferential treatment by the ILEC of its own
retail operations when providing network access, and insufficient
discounts offered by the ILEC when selling its wholesale services to the
CLECs. AT&T has argued that the failure of CLECs and their problems in
gaining market share in local telephony arise from discriminatory behavior
by the ILECs. Some CLECs have blamed their lack of success on their
16 COMPETITIVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION, STRUCTURAL INCENTIVES: THE
SIMPLER, MORE EFFICIENT PATH TO LOCAL COMPETITION (presented at the Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory
Util. Comm'rs Summer Meeting, July 14, 2001), at 4 [hereinafter COMPTEL STUDY].
17 Id. at 5.
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inability to lease facilities from the ILECs in a timely fashion. These
CLECs have alleged "delaying tactics, inaccurate information and pricing
tricks" of the ILECs' wholesale divisions against unaffiliated retail
providers." Mr. Armstrong of AT&T has blamed the ILECs for not
providing the CLECs with "adequate system support" and for mishandling
competitive requests.' 9 AT&T and other carriers have argued that
mandatory structural separation of the ILECs is necessary to give the
CLECs nondiscriminatory access to the ILECs' computer systems that
manage customer data.2°
B. The Argument that Mandatory Structural Separation Would "Level
the Playing Field" Between Nonaffiliated Local Retail Providers and
the ILECs
Seizing on the evidence of CLEC failures, AT&T and the CLEC
industry associations have petitioned state public utility commissions
("PUCs") to mandate structural separation of the ILECs in the name of
preventing their allegedly anticompetitive behavior against the CLECs.
21
1. CompTel's Idealized Vision of Structural Separation
According to CompTel, the fundamental notion of mandatory
structural separation is "to place the ILEC's retail operations in the shoes
of a CLEC-ordering UNEs, establishing customer accounts, and
incurring UNE charges just like any other provider., 22 To achieve this
objective, CompTel proposes two basic structural conditions:
First, the Retail Company must use exactly the same operational
interfaces as other CLECs, standing as a distinct entity-ordering
interconnection, JNEs (and UNE combinations) and collocation services
from the Wholesale Company, and constrained by the same systems and
policies as any other carrier. In this way, any concern that the incumbent
would impose complex, costly and inefficient systems on entrants would
be greatly reduced because the incumbent's own retail operations would
18 Competition in Local Phone Service Fails to Connect, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2001, at
I OA.
19 Id.
20 A T&T Seeks Structural Separation of Verizon in New Jersey, TELECOMM. REP. DAILY,
Feb. 27, 2001.
21 See, e.g., Initial Comments of AT&T Communications of Pennsylvania Inc., Joint
Petition to Adopt Settlement Agreement and to Terminate the Proceeding, Dkt. No. N-
00001353F0002, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Jan. 2, 2001.
22 COMPTEL STUDY, supra note 16, at 6.
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be subjected to the same inefficiencies. Second, the retail affiliate must
view its UNE-payments to the wholesale entity in the same way as any
entrant-as actual outlays that affect its profitability. To achieve this
latter condition, the retail entity cannot be a wholly-owned affiliate of the
parent. Under a structure where both entities are wholly-owned by the
parent, any payment by one affiliate to the other is an economic fiction.
Because shareholders only judge management by its consolidated
performance, it is irrelevant what one affiliate "pays" another.
23
Mandatory structural separation would require "sufficient independent
ownership" of the retail and wholesale companies.2 4 CompTel outlines the
ownership structure of the retail affiliate, which includes the creation of a
separate publicly traded stock for the retail affiliate and, of course, a
distinct name.
In addition to the above structural conditions, CompTel would add
two conduct remedies for mandatory structural separation to work. First,
the retail affiliate would initially be established without customers and
would be dependent upon the same provisioning systems to obtain
25customers as any other CLEC. Because of the implementation process,
the wholesale company would continue to serve the embedded base on a
transitional basis. Second, the ILEC would not initiate service to any new
account, transfer service to a different location, or introduce any new
26service.
2. The OECD's Idealized Vision of Structural Separation
In April 2001, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") issued a report entitled, Structural Separation in
Regulated Industries.2 7 The report focused on structural methods for
improving competition in industries supplied by a regulated monopolist.
The OECD found vertical integration by regulated monopolists to be a
problem because those entities "may have both the incentive and the
ability to restrict competition in the competitive component . . . by
controlling the terms and conditions at which rival firms in the competitive
1128component have access to the non-competitive component.
23 Id. (footnotes omitted).
24 Id. at 7.
25 Id. at 8.
26 Id.
27 OECD, supra note 12.
28 Id. 2.
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Applied to the market for local telecommunications services, the
OECD considered wholesale services to be the "non-competitive
component" and retail services to be the "competitive component." The
OECD proposed six remedies to maintain competition in the competitive
component. Applied to local telephony, the six remedies would take the
following form:
1. Conduct remedies: restrictions on the operations of the ILEC's
retail unit
2. Equal access: promotion of fair access to the wholesale products
and services of an ILEC
3. Ownership separation: structural separation of the ILEC's
wholesale and retail divisions
4. "Club" or joint ownership: shared ownership of the ILEC's
wholesale division by competitive retail firms
5. Operational separation: transfer of control of the ILEC's
wholesale operations to an independent entity
6. Horizontal divestiture: separation of the ILEC into smaller,
vertically integrated carriers2 9
Of the six remedies, the first two are behavioral remedies and the last four
are structural remedies. Some of the structural remedies are mutually
exclusive.
The OECD incorrectly believed that structural remedies are simple
while behavioral remedies require more regulation. Thus, when it
specifically addressed the telecommunications industry in its report, the
OECD examined only the ownership-separation and horizontal-divestiture
options. Moreover, the OECD did not provide a critical analysis of these
remedies but instead, listed member countries that have implemented
various forms of structural separation.
The OECD favored ownership separation and horizontal divestiture
for telecommunications carriers because it believed that such separation
would bring the ILEC's incentives into alignment with a non-integrated
carrier, promote competitiveness, and "alleviate" the need for regulation.3 °
For this reason, the OECD gave special attention to the separation of local
fixed-wire service from mobile service and broadband service." Although
the OECD argued that ownership separation would promote entry and
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innovations in the services offered to final consumers may require
investments in both the services provided by the competitive and non-
competitive activities., 32 The OECD did not attempt to quantify the effects
of these countervailing forces on industry innovation, so it is not evident
that ownership separation would result in greater innovation.
The OECD also advocated the separation of the ILEC into smaller
vertically integrated carriers because it believed that doing so would
promote interconnection by reducing the bargaining position of monopoly
telephone providers, without jeopardizing economies of scope.33 The
fallacy of such reasoning is that the goal of promoting interconnection
could be accomplished through the far less restrictive means of open
access regulation. In the United States, for example, interconnection
prices, terms, and conditions are regulated by the state public utilities, and,
thus, the OECD's concern with high interconnection rates is largely
irrelevant.34
Finally, the OECD admitted that behavioral remedies, such as access
regulation or restrictions on retail operations, could also curtail the
vertically integrated firm's ability to discriminate against competitors. The
OECD concluded, however, that such behavioral regulation can never be
fully effective:
An integrated firm, in contrast to a separated firm, benefits from any
action which delays the provision of, raises the price or lowers the
quality of access. An integrated firm will therefore use whatever
regulatory, legal, political or economic mechanisms are in its power
to delay, restrict the quality or raise the price of access. Furthermore,
the integrated firm has strong incentives to innovate in this area,
constantly developing new techniques for delaying access. Although
the regulator can address these techniques as they arise, it is likely to
always be "catching up" with the incumbent firm. Regulation,
despite its best efforts, is unlikely to be able to completely offset the
advantage of the incumbent.
35
32 Id. 60, 82.
33 Id. 190.
34 The OECD stated that few countries have pursued regional separation, but noted that the
United States divided AT&T into seven regional operating and one long-distance company, and that
"the U.S. telecommunications regime is currently one of the most competitive in the world." Id. 152.
In 1999, Japan similarly divided NTT into two regional operating companies and one long-distance
company. Id. at 79, tbl.A-10. However, a holding company still owns these separate business units.
35 Id. 66.
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The OECD failed to recognize that it is not the regulator's job to
"completely offset the advantages of the incumbent." This statement
suggests a competitor-welfare orientation. Such a focus takes no account
of advantages enjoyed by the incumbent as a result of superior efficiency.
The proper measure of any regulation is not the extent to which it
purportedly makes the regulator's job easier, but rather the extent to which
it can achieve its desired end-the enhancement of consumer welfare-by
the least restrictive means.
In summary, although the OECD asserted that structural separation is
the best way to promote competition, it did not provide convincing
evidence that such separation would alter the incentives of the firm. For
example, the wholesale provider might enter into exclusive arrangements
with particular retailers to achieve efficiencies or to align incentives, or
both. Furthermore, the OECD's criteria for judging the usefulness of
structural separation are flawed, both in their focus on competitor welfare
and in their emphasis on the ease of regulation to the exclusion of
consumer welfare maximization.
C. Structural Separation in Practice
On the surface, mandatory structural separation would seem to
involve the simple separation of the ILEC's wholesale local exchange
functions from its retail local exchange functions. But the Pennsylvania
PUC came to regard the promised simplicity of structural separation as
illusory. The Commission subsequently retreated from its original
imposition of structural separation on Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania until all
that remained was a code of conduct. 36 The Florida PSC similarly
concluded that structural separation was not necessary for effective
competition, and that it would confound current regulatory efforts before
they have been tested.
1. The Pennsylvania PUC's Experience
To understand better what the implementation of structural separation
would entail, it is informative to examine the original proposals
contemplated but rejected by the Pennsylvania PUC. The Pennsylvania
36 The Pennsylvania PUC rejected AT&T's proposals to retain the separate wholesale
affiliate's ILEC status (subject to existing rate and quality-of-service regulation by the PUC), while the
separate retail affiliate's noncompetitive services would remain subject to price-cap regulation.
Structural Separation of Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., Retail and Wholesale Operations, Dkt. No.
M-00001353, at 24, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Mar. 22, 2001 (opinion and order) [hereinafter
Pennsylvania Opinion and Order].
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PUC also revealed, when it imposed a form of structural separation on Bell
Atlantic-Pennsylvania in 2001, that the actual implementation of structural
separation was complex and involved conduct remedies.
In September 1999, the PUC issued a "Global Order" instructing
Verizon to structurally separate its wholesale operations from its retail
operations. The PUC asserted in the Global Order that structural separation
was not only the most efficient tool to ensure local service competition,
but also necessary to accomplish that goal.
In October 2000, Pennsylvania's Commonwealth Court upheld all
aspects of the PUC's Global Order, which had paved the way for the
PUC's Structural Separation Order of April 2000.37 The order mandated
the full separation of Verizon's wholesale and retail branches, absent proof
by Verizon that full structural separation would be "unreasonably costly,
unduly burdensome, or confiscatory."38 In January 2001, an administrative
law judge found that Verizon's filings failed to make the necessary
showing.39 He rejected Verizon's alternative proposal to split off an
advanced data services affiliate and directed Verizon to begin a one-year
transition to full structural separation.
40
In a reversal of its previous defense of the superiority of structural
separation over conduct remedies (and its notion that structural separation
could largely supplant conduct remedies), the Pennsylvania PUC
acknowledged in its March 2001 Opinion and Order that either full or
functional separation would require substantial implementation costs and
complementary behavioral remedies, and that neither would reduce
regulatory oversight:
[A]nything less than full structural separation would require continuing
regulatory oversight, even though part of our goal in deregulating the
industry is to reduce oversight. However, . . . even with the
implementation of structural separation of Verizon's wholesale and retail
arms, no less regulatory oversight than that currently prevailing will be
required to ensure compliance. 41
37 Structural Separation of Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc., Retail and Wholesale Operations,
Dkt. No. M-00001353, at 10, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Jan. 2001 (recommended decision).
38 Id. at 5, 10.
39 Id. at 14.
40 Id.
41 Pennsylvania Opinion and Order, supra note 36, at 47.
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One commissioner subsequently said that structural separation "didn't look
like as much of a silver bullet when we looked at the details of it."4 2 To
address these difficulties inherent in structural separation, the PUC devised
a novel two-pronged form of separation, which it called
"functional/structural separation." 3 The first prong mandated that the
ILEC undertake "functional separation" of its wholesale and retail units-
that is, the ILEC would have to separate its wholesale and retail divisions
in a way that "provides for non-discriminatory access to its wholesale
division by all CLECs." 44 Activities that the Pennsylvania PUC
functionally separated from Verizon's wholesale operations included
personnel, accounting, record keeping, and business practices. The second
prong directed the ILEC to create an advanced-services affiliate, separate
from the retail division of its business.4
To identify specific behavioral constraints, the Pennsylvania PUC
reopened a separate proceeding regarding the "code of conduct" governing
Verizon. 6 Moreover, the Commission imposed ten additional behavioral
requirements on Verizon:
47
* compliance with rules guaranteeing the interconnection of
advanced services with CLECs;
* compliance with rules guaranteeing a CLEC's access to digital
subscriber line access multiplexers ("DSLAMs") in remote
terminals consistent with an industry standard (to be determined in
a technical workshop);
" implementation of a technical trial of electronic loop provisioning;
* creation of a collaborative body to address the design of next
generation digital line carrier ("NGDLC") and equal access to
digital subscriber line ("DSL") over fiber;
* implementation of rules guaranteeing monthly meetings for
CLECs, which will be arbitrated by a PUC Commissioner;
" creation of a collaborative body to address the issue of line
splitting;
* withdrawal by Verizon of all state and federal court challenges to
the Global Order mandating structural separation;
42 Chris Sewell, Still Together, TELEPHONY, Apr. 2, 2001 (quoting PUC Commissioner
Terrance J. Fitzpatrick).
43 Pennsylvania Opinion and Order, supra note 36, at 30.
44 Id. at 59.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 60.
47 Id. at 49-57.
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* increased penalties to be paid by Verizon if it does not comply
with certain metrics-for example, liquidated damages were
increased an additional $1,000 per metric violated;
* decreased rates for two-wire loops in the most rural areas of the
state; and
* retention of responsibility by Verizon for network modernization.
The Pennsylvania PUC's decision to impose a full complement of
behavioral remedies in conjunction with functional separation
demonstrates that it was not confident that such separation would quickly
diminish the need for regulation.
The Pennsylvania PUC originally retreated from mandatory structural
separation because it came to recognize that structural separation involved
much more regulatory oversight than the actual or functional bifurcation of
an ILEC's wholesale and retail assets. In effect, the Pennsylvania PUC
repudiated its original determination in September 1999 that structural
separation was the "most efficient tool to ensure local telephone
competition where a large incumbent monopoly controls the market." ''
Ultimately, the Pennsylvania PUC decided in November 2001 to reject its
directive for full functional separation and to rely instead on its code of
conduct to promote competition. In December 2001, Commissioner
Terrance Fitzpatrick called functional separation an "intrusive remedy
designed to fix a problem that has not been shown to exist,' 9 citing the
FCC's approval of Verizon's Section 271 application in Pennsylvania.
50
2. The Florida PSC's Experience
In March 2001, AT&T Communications, TCG South Florida, and
MediaOne Florida Telecommunications petitioned the Florida Public
Service Commission ("PSC") to order the structural separation of
BellSouth. The petitioners alleged that BellSouth had engaged in
anticompetitive actions, and that full structural separation was necessary to
48 Pennsylvania Global Order, supra note 9, at 222.
49 Glenn Bischoff, Pennsylvania Loss Reflects AT&T's Regulatory Struggles, TELEPHONY,
Dec. 10, 2001.
50 Id.; see also Motion of Commissioner Terrance J. Fitzpatrick, Implementation of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Imputation Requirements for the Delivery of IntraLATA Services
by Local Exchange Carriers, Dkt. No. M-00960799, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n ("In light of the conclusion
of this Commission and the FCC that Verizon's local market is open-including a finding that Verizon
is providing wholesale services in a non-discriminatory manner[,]... it is not necessary to require
Verizon to separate all of its employees and facilities into separate wholesale and retail divisions. I
note that neither the United States Congress, nor the FCC, nor any other state has deemed such a
reorganization of an ILEC necessary in order to protect competition.").
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promote competition in local markets." The PSC responded by conducting
a series of workshops on structural separation and local exchange
competition.
After the final workshop, in November 2001, the PSC granted
BellSouth's motion to dismiss the CLECs' petitions on the grounds that
the PSC lacked any authority to impose structural separation, and,
therefore, it could not grant the relief requested by the petitioners.5 3 The
PSC criticized the CLECs' petition as "a solution in search of a problem"
and noted that the CLECs had "request[ed] relief so draconian that of the
states that have examined the issue, all have rejected it."'54 Most
importantly, the PSC rejected the CLECs' contention that structural
separation was necessary for local competition:
To find that structural separation is necessary to promote competition, as
the Petitioners urge, implies at best, that we question our confidence that
the other dockets will promote competition; and at worst, that our earlier
efforts have been in vain. Similarly, this most recent Petition either is
cumulative, or will interfere with, our earlier efforts, many of which are
ongoing."
The Florida PSC recognized that a hasty implementation of structural
separation would have the practical effect of superseding existing open-
access remedies before the PSC could determine their efficacy:
Each additional regulation imposed on BellSouth creates costs and
inefficiencies; may interfere with other regulations previously imposed;
and brings uncertainty to an industry in which stability is necessary to
foster competition. Not only is it premature to judge the efficacy of our
earlier efforts, but it is also premature to determine that another solution
is necessary.56
Finally, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
Florida PSC found that structurally separating BellSouth could hamper its
51 Petition of AT&T Communications, supra note 9.
52 Order Granting BellSouth's Motion to Dismiss AT&T's and FCCA's Petitions for
Structural Separation, Dkt. No. 010345-TP, at 2, Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Nov. 6, 2001, available at
http://www.psc.state.fl.us/dockets/documents/01/13992-O .html.
53 Id. at 6.
54 Id. at 7, 8.
55 Id. at 8.
56 Id. at 8.
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ability to react to national emergencies, describing this hindrance as "a risk
to our economy and consumers that we are not willing to take."57
In short, the Florida PSC concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to order
structural separation. It rejected the contention that structural separation
was necessary for local competition. To the contrary, the Florida PSC
concluded that structural separation would confound existing regulatory
efforts aimed at promoting such competition.
D. The Purported Merits of Mandatory Structural Separation
There are principally two purported benefits to mandatory structural
separation. First, according to its proponents, structural separation would
guarantee nondiscriminatory access to the ILECs' networks. For example,
CompTel has argued that the incentives established under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 are insufficient to induce ILECs to offer
nondiscriminatory access to their networks. By changing course, CompTel
reasoned, state PUCs "can create an environment where an ILEC's own
commercial success depends upon its ability to offer efficient access to the
existing network. 5 8 In its formal petition for mandatory structural
separation of Verizon in New Jersey, AT&T argued that such regulatory
intervention would accomplish, among other things, nondiscriminatory
access by competitors to the components of Verizon's network 9-that is,
unaffiliated and affiliated retailers of local telecommunications services
would be treated equally in the provision of UJNEs.
Second, structural separation purportedly would lower wholesale
discount rates. To justify mandatory structural separation of the ILECs in
the local market, Mr. Armstrong argued that the divestiture of AT&T's
long-distance operations from the local-exchange operations of the former
Bell System produced greater wholesale discounts (for long-distance
resellers) that are significantly lower than the wholesale discounts charged
by the ILECs for local services. He claimed that wholesale discounts for
long-distance service are five times larger than wholesale discounts for
local service (55% in long-distance service versus 10% in local service).6°
In Part II, we examine critically AT&T's diagnosis of the CLECs' problem
and its proposed solution.
57 Id. at 10.
58 COMPTEL STUDY, supra note 16, at 6.
59 Press Release, AT&T, AT&T Files Formal Petition for "Structural Separation" of
Verizon-New Jersey (Feb. 28, 2001) (on file with author).
60 Armstrong Warns AT&T May Pull Out of Local Phone Markets, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 8,
2001 [hereinafter Armstrong Warns].
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E. Japan's Cautious Evaluation of Structural Separation
In Japan, the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts
and Telecommunications ("MPHPT") closely monitors developments in
U.S. telecommunications policy. For example, the Japanese approach to
ordering the reorganization of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone into
separate long-distance and regional local exchange companies resembled
the AT&T divestiture in the United States.61 Given Japan's general
receptivity to American approaches to telecommunications regulation, it is
noteworthy that the MPHPT has taken a cautious approach to structural
separation after carefully studying the debate on the issue in the United
States.
In February 2002, MPHPT received, from an expert group called the
Telecommunications Council, the second in a series of reports containing
recommendations for Japanese telecommunications policy.62  Upon
receiving the report, the MPHPT said that it would "take appropriate
measures on the report., 63 In what it called Stage One of its procompetitive
policies, the Council advocated further openness of the networks of NTT
East and NTT West, in part through reliance on "rigorous firewalls to
provide functional separation." 64 The Council also outlined a more
invasive Stage Two:
61 See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall, Telecommunications Liberalization: The US. Model, in
DEREGULATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 415 (Takatoshi Ito & Anne 0.
Krueger eds., 2000). In June 1997, the Japanese Diet authorized a plan of reorganization for NTT that
the predecessor agency of the MPHPT, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, had proposed
and NTT had accepted in principle. See NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION, ANNUAL
REPORT 2001, at 13 (for the year ended Mar. 31, 2001). Once the reorganization took effect on July 1,
1999, NTT became a holding company with several wholly owned subsidiaries, including NTT East,
NTT West, NTT Communications, and NTT DoCoMo (a wireless company). Id. NTT East and NTT
West are both regional fixed-line operators analogous to a regional Bell operating company in the
United States.
The MPHPT receives more than subtle encouragement to follow American regulatory practices.
The U.S. Trade Representative cajoles Japan, upon implicit threats of trade sanctions, to emulate U.S.
regulatory policies concerning local telecommunications. See Jeffrey H. Rohlfs & J. Gregory Sidak,
Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The U.S.-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing,
43 HARV. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
62 TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL, SECOND REPORT ON DESIRABLE PRO-COMPETITIVE
POLICIES IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUSINESS FIELD FOR PROMOTING THE IT REVOLUTION
(INQUIRY No. 29 of 2000) (Feb. 13, 2002) (prepared for MPHPT), printed in 12 MPHPT
COMMUNICATIONS NEWS, no. 24, Mar. 18, 2002, at I (English summary posted at
http://www.soumu.go.jp/joho-tsusin/eng/index.html) [hereinafter SECOND REPORT]; see also Panel
Threatens NTT with Splitup, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2001, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.p15?nb200l1213a7.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
63 SECOND REPORT, supra note 62, at 1.
64 Id. ch. 1 8(1), at 2 ("Proceed with opening up network access such as resale of public
networks and opening up of OSS [operations support systems], together with rigorous firewalls to
provide functional separation. Furthermore, there are expectations for new entry from other sectors and
increased new market entry when the business category classification is revised.").
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Stage 1 considers a variety of non-structural pro-competitive policies. Of
those, if the resale of public networks and access to fiber-optic networks,
which the report gives special emphasis to, have not been implemented
despite proper requests from competitors, and sufficient competition
cannot be seen in regional telecommunications markets after two years,
fundamental review of NTT's management system will be quickly
required. In such a case, various options should be considered such as
full capital separation and separation of wholesale and retail operations.
65
In other words, the Council concluded that it would be inappropriate for
the MPHPT even to consider ordering structural separation of wholesale
and retail operations of NTT East and NTT West unless two years'
experience proved functional separation to be inadequate to protect
competition.
If structural separation were deemed necessary, MPHPT would then
need to specify its form. Having studied other countries, the Council
identified two different approaches to structural separation: "one in which
existing regional carriers move toward structural separation on their own
to request deregulation, and one in which the regulatory authorities require
the regional carriers to undergo structural separation., 66 The second
variant is exemplified by the original structural separation plan of the
Pennsylvania PUC, described earlier. The first variant is exemplified by
voluntary and unsolicited plans for structural separation, which we discuss
later in Part 11.67 Although the Council noted that, "[i]n both of these cases,
the orientation of the eventual trend is still unclear,, 61 it nonetheless said
that mandatory structural separation "is worth examining as one of the
options in drastically reviewing the management format of NIT East and
NTT West.,
69
The Council, however, recognized several disadvantages of structural
separation. Such regulatory intervention would be protracted, costly, and
controversial-as well as uncertain in its efficacy because, the Council
observed, "there are no actual cases in other countries, and it is hard to
generate confidence that a smooth implementation is possible. 7 °
Moreover, "the monopolistic status of bottleneck facilities will not change
65 Id. ch. 1 8(2), at 2.
66 Id. ch. I 7(l), at 2.
67 See infra Subsection Il.C.4.d.
68 SECOND REPORT, supra note 62, at ch. I 7(1), at 2.
69 Excerpt from English Translation of Entire Second Report, 7(3)(b)(1) (Jan. 30, 2002)
(provided by NTT West; copy on file with authors). The MPHPT website contains only an English
summary of the report, not an English translation of the entire report.
70 Id. 7(3)(c)(1).
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before or after structural separation.",71 Consequently, the Council noted,
the goal of a competitive local telecommunications market "would better
be addressed" through policies on interconnection pricing and
investment.72
II. A Critique of AT&T's Hypothesis and Its Proposed Remedy
AT&T argues that CLECs have failed because the ILECs have acted
anticompetitively. AT&T's proposed remedy is mandatory structural
separation of the ILECs. We consider now why AT&T's hypothesis is
unpersuasive and its remedy a socially costly non sequitur.
A. The Inability ofAllegedly Anticompetitive Practices to Explain
Market and Regulatory Phenomena
The hypothesis of the proponents of structural separation is
inconsistent with many facts concerning regulation and actual competitive
entry.
1. The Steady Increase in CLECs' Market Share
Despite the much-publicized bankruptcy of individual firms, the
CLECs collectively have fared well. According to FCC data released in
February 2002, CLEC market share grew by 109% during the eighteen
months between the end of 1999 and the end of June 2001. 73 CLECs
reported 17.3 million (or 9.0%) of the approximately 192 million
nationwide local switched-access telephone lines in service to end-users on
June 30, 2001, compared with 8.2 million (or 4.3% of nationwide lines) of
189.5 million lines at the end of 1999.7 4 For the medium and large business
market, CLEC lines numbered 9.5 million (or 19.1% of nationwide
business lines).75 For the residential and small businesses market, CLECs
supplied 7.8 million lines (or 5.5% of nationwide residential and small
business lines).76 Because of the geographic clustering of business
customers, there are large economies of density in serving the business
71 Id. 7(3)(c)(3).
72 Id.
73 LOCAL TELEPHONE UPDATE, supra note 2, at tbl. 1.
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market. Hence, it is no surprise that CLECs have focused their entry
initiatives on the business markets. Figure 1 shows the CLEC market share
of all nationwide end-user telephone lines as of December 2000.












Jun-98 Dec-98 Jun-99 Dec-99 Jun-00 Dec-00 Jun-01 Dec-01
Date
Sources: Local Competition, Industry Analysis Division, Common Carrier Bureau, at 6, Dec. 1998;
FCC News Release, Federal Communications Commission Releases Latest Data on Local Telephone
Competition, at 2 (Aug. 31, 1999), at 2; FCC News Release, Federal Communications Commission
Releases Latest Data on Local Telephone Competition, at tbl. 1 (Feb. 22, 2002).
As Figure 1 demonstrates, CLECs are gaining market share at a brisk pace.
In some individual markets, CLEC market shares are considerably higher
than Figure 1 suggests. In a city-by-city analysis of CLEC entry in New
York state, for example, the New York Public Service Commission found
that, as of the end of 2000, CLEC market shares exceeded 15% in Albany,
Syracuse, and Buffalo and exceeded 20% in New York City and
Rochester. 7 Figure 2 presents these data. As Figure 2 shows, the CLECs'
share in New York City has increased from 6% to 23% over a period of
three years.
77 NEW YORK PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 5.
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Figure 2. CLEC Market Shares in New York State, 1998-2000
Poughkeepsie Binghamton Albany Syracuse Buffalo New York Rochester
Source: NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 5.
It would be a mistake, however, to judge the growth of competition in
local telephony since passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
solely by measuring CLEC market share in local services over time. The
welfare of local service consumers (as opposed to local service suppliers)
will increase as prices more accurately reflect costs or as the quality of
local exchange service increases. Hence, regulators and legislators should
focus more on the prices and quality of the service offerings rather than
fixate on CLEC market share. For example, simply because AT&T can
provide local telephony services over its unregulated cable platform, there
is no guarantee that those consumers who wish to switch from ILEC
service will be better off. It is also doubtful whether a CLEC providing
service over an ILEC's network can offer end users a service at a lower
price or a better service at the same price. Hence, high CLEC market share
might not correlate with increased consumer welfare in the context of
regulated retail rates.
What would be the proper benchmark to determine, as Goldilocks
might, whether that rate of decline in the ILECs' market share is too fast,
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the local (non-cable) landline switched-access lines.78 But, as of June
2001, Verizon had lost 13% of end-user switched-access lines in
Pennsylvania to CLECs, up from 8% a year earlier.79 The attainment of
competitive markets for local telephony should not become a process of
monitoring the ILECs' eroding market share, along the lines of the FCC's
obsession in the 1980s with defining the competitiveness of long-distance
markets in terms of the erosion of AT&T's dominant share. 80 Ultimately,
legislators, regulators, and courts should judge the competitiveness of the
local services market (and the success of the Telecommunications Act of
1996) from the perspective of the consumer-not that of a particular
competitor.8' That criterion, after all, is precisely what the preamble of the
1996 legislation establishes, as we noted in the first sentence of this
Article.82
In the Sections that follow, we describe the growing competition for
local services in both the large business market and the residential and
small business markets.
a. The Large Business Market
The CLECs have rapidly deployed fiber lines to offer local services in
business districts. From 1997 to the end of 2000, the number of route miles
of fiber that CLECs had deployed grew from 78,506 to 218,445.83 Over the
same period, the number of installed voice switches owned by CLECs
grew from 334 to 991, and the number of installed data switches grew
even more rapidly, from 331 to 2,071 .84 Furthermore, several of the
nation's largest operators of long-haul fiber networks have constructed
local fiber networks and now lease dark fiber on those networks to
CLECs."5
78 LOCAL TELEPHONE UPDATE, supra note 2.
79 Id. at tbl.7.
80 See Sirran K. Kahal, David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Is the "Dominant Firm"
Dominant? An EmpiricalAnalysis ofAT&Ts Market Power, 39 J.L. & ECON. 499 (1996); John Haing &
Kathy Levitz, What Makes the Dominant Firm Dominant? (FCC, Office of Plans and Policy, OPP
Working Paper No. 25, Apr. 1989).
81 See Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer- Welfare Approach to the
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999).
82 See supra text accompanying note 1.
83 ASSOCIATION FOR LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, THE STATE OF LOCAL
COMPETITION 2000, at 25, available at http://www.alts.org/Filings/022001AnnualReport.pdf
[hereinafter ALTS REPORT].
84 Id. at 24.
85 UNITED STATES TELECOM ASSOCIATION, COMPETITION FOR SPECIAL ACCESS SERVICES,
HIGH-CAPACITY LOOPS, AND INTEROFFICE TRANSPORT, at 3 (Apr. 5, 2001) (prepared for BellSouth,
SBC, Qwest, and Verizon) [hereinafter USTA STUDY].
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Individual CLECs have deployed fiber networks at a rapid pace. For
example, in November 2000, Sprint announced that it was deploying local
fiber rings in twenty major U.S. markets.86 Williams expects to spend $421
million between 2000 and 2003 to link its proposed 33,000-mile fiber-
optic backbone network directly to business customers in the nation's
largest cities.8 7 Qwest is building local fiber rings in twenty-five major
metropolitan markets to give customers direct, high-speed connections to
Qwest's global broadband Internet network.88
The availability of competitive alternatives to the high-capacity loops
and interoffice transport that ILECs provide to businesses is widespread
and has continued to grow rapidly. From 1999 to 2001, there has been a
dramatic increase in local fiber supplied by "carrier-agnostic" wholesale
suppliers.89 For a growing number of CLECs, the fiber provided by these
wholesale suppliers satisfies a large part of their demand for last-mile local
connectivity and interoffice transport.
b. The Residential and Small Business Markets
In contrast to the massive investment by CLECs in business areas,
CLEC investment in residential areas has been slower because of two
regulatory distortions. Additional investment could be encouraged in those
areas by more efficient pricing of UNEs, wholesale rates, and retail rates
for residential customers. Rules requiring mandatory unbundling at prices
based on total element long-run incremental cost ("TELRIC") distort
CLECs' incentives to invest in their own facilities in several ways. First,
the pricing policies of the FCC on UNEs have encouraged CLECs'
reliance on ILEC facilities. Pricing access too low not only distorts the
decision of incumbents,90 but also undermines the incentive to invest by
86 Press Release, Sprint FON Group, Sprint Announces Financial Targets and Growth
Strategies (Nov. 3, 2000) (on file with author).
87 Corey Grice, Williams to Expand High-Speed Network into 50 Cities, NEWS.COM, Feb.
10, 2000, http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-1546995.html?tag=st.
88 Press Release, Qwest Communications, Qwest Communications Launches High-Speed
Broadband Access Services to Businesses in Four Texas Markets (Oct. 25, 2000) (on file with author).
89 USTA STUDY, supra note 85, at 2.
90 Unbundling at TELRIC-based prices truncates the high-end of the distribution of returns
on investment for ILECs, which reduces their incentive to invest in new facilities. See Hausman &
Sidak, supra note 81. For empirical validation of this relationship, see Eisner & Lehman, infra note
246; see also ALFRED E. KAHN, LETTING Go: DEREGULATING THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION
(1998) [hereinafter KAHN, LETTING Go]; Thomas M. Jorde, J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece,
Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2000); Jerry A. Hausman, The Effect
of Sunk Cost in Telecommunications Regulation, in THE NEW INVESTMENT THEORY OF REAL OPTIONS
AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS (James Alleman & Eli Noam eds.,
1999); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy ofForward-Looking
Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1068 (1997); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the
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CLECs. Because a CLEC cannot redeploy many of the elements of a
telecommunications network if they prove to be uneconomical, it pays for
the CLEC to "wait and see" how well other investments in the
telecommunications industry have performed before committing itself to
investing its own capital. 9'
Second, when considered alongside the artificially depressed prices of
residential local service in many states, the cost-based pricing of network
elements-no matter how low-would not encourage entry by CLECs. To
provide telecommunications services to all residents, the FCC and the state
PUCs have designed a cross-subsidy scheme that restricts the price of
residential service below costs. 92 In particular, the returns from providing
local service to business customers are used to support residential rates.93
It is no accident that CLECs first target business customers rather than
residential customers. No unregulated profit-maximizing firm would
voluntary absorb a share of the universal service fund required to serve
residential customers at below-cost rates.
2. Regulatory Approval for RBOC Entry into Long-Distance
Services
There exists a separate "reality check" on the claim that the ILECs
have engaged in anticompetitive behavior toward CLECs and that such
behavior necessitates mandatory structural separation. The entry of the
regional Bell operating companies into the interLATA long-distance
markets is subject to intense regulatory scrutiny under Section 271 of the
Communications Act.94 The fact that the RBOCs have received Section
271 approvals in eleven states as of April 20029' implies that the
Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1081 (1997) [hereinafter Sidak & Spulber, The Tragedy of the
Telecommons].
91 For an application of real options analysis to telecommunications investment, see
Hausman & Sidak, supra note 81.
92 See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL
SERVICE?: WHEN TELEPHONE SUBSIDIES BECOME TRANSPARENT (2000).
93 See id.; Karen Palmer, A Test for Cross Subsidies in Local Telephone Rates: Do Business
Customers Subsidize Residential Customers?, 23 RAND J. ECON. 415 (1992).
94 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). For an economic assessment of the rigors of Section 271 entry
process, see Paul W. MacAvoy, Testing Competitiveness of Markets for Long Distance Telephone
Services: Competition Finally?, 13 REV. INDUS. ORG. 295 (1998).
95 As of April 20, 2002, the BOCs had received Section 271 authorizations in eleven states
on the following dates: Arkansas (Nov. 16, 2001), Connecticut (July 20, 2001), Kansas (Jan. 22, 2001),
Massachusetts (Apr. 16, 2001), Missouri (Nov. 16, 2001), New York (Dec. 22, 1999), Oklahoma (Jan.
22, 2001), Pennsylvania (Sept. 19, 2001), Rhode Island (Feb. 24, 2002), Texas (June 30, 2000), and
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respective state PUCs and the FCC and the U.S. Department of Justice had
determined that entry conditions in those local markets were sufficiently
open to allow local competition. That is, eleven state PUCs and the FCC
and the Department of Justice had determined by April 2002 that
mandatory structural separation of the wholesale and retail divisions of the
local Bell operating company was not necessary to ensure a competitive
local services market. It is hardly credible that entry conditions in those
eleven states are so different from the conditions that prevail in New
Jersey or Virginia that a separate economic test must be applied in the
latter set of states. More likely, the proponents of mandatory structural
separation recognize that, as long as the state PUCs, the FCC, and the
Department of Justice judge the RBOCs under the entry conditions
articulated in Section 271 and amplified in the FCC's First Report and
Order on local interconnection, 96 the RBOCs will gain entry into the long-
distance markets of a significant number of other states and thereby erode
long-distance carriers' margins by late 2002.
3. Other Factors that Suggest Greater Competition
Although residential and small business markets have attracted less
facilities-based entry by CLECs than the large business market has, it is
nonetheless true that cable television and wireless provide an access
substitute for many residential wireline customers. Such substitution is
widespread enough to have given rise to the phrase "landline
displacement," which we now consider.
a. Substitution from Cable Television
Cable telephony was introduced as recently as 1999 and although
AT&T struggled initially, the number of cable telephony subscribers began
to accelerate rapidly near the middle of 2000. According to the FCC's
Eighth Annual Report on Competition in Video Markets, as of January
2001, only circuit-switched cable telephony was commercially deployed,
but trials had begun for cable-delivered (packet-switched) Internet-
Vermont (Apr. 17, 2002). See FCC, RBOC Applications to Provide In-region, InterLATA Services
Under § 271, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/ComnionCarrier/in-region-applications.
96 In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996) (First Report and Order), rev'd in part and aff'd in part sub noam.
Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), revd in part and aff'd in part sub noam. AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) [hereinafter Local Competition First Report and Order].
Vol. 19:335, 2002
Structural Separation of ILECs
protocol ("IP") telephony. 97 Cox and AT&T continue to deploy circuit-
switched cable telephony.9 Other cable companies, such as Cablevision
and Comcast, were offering cable telephony on a limited basis, waiting
instead for IP technology to become widely available before accelerating
their rollout of telephone services to customers.99 Over 1.2 million
customers received local telephone service through their cable system as of
the end of 2000.00°
Because cable firms reach over 80% of all U.S. households and the
majority of those connections will be two-way enabled by the end of 2002,
no amount of anticompetitive behavior by ILECs could prevent cable
firms-such as AT&T and AOL Time Warner-from capturing a large
share of the local exchange market. Stated differently, the potential market
share of local exchange service for cable telephony is only limited by the
cable firms' collective ingenuity.
According to Mr. Armstrong of AT&T, FCC regulations that limit the
number of homes that a single cable multiple system operator ("MSO")
may reach have prevented vigorous competition for the supply of local
telephony to residential customers. Because of such limitations, Mr.
Armstrong argues, "the only chance for competitors like AT&T to offer
broad-based competition in the local market is to lease pieces of the Bells'
facilities."' 0'1 On March 2, 2001, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit struck down, as unconstitutional, the
FCC's regulations limiting the growth of the nation's largest cable MSOs
and preventing them from presenting more of their own programs.
°2
Therefore, according to Mr. Armstrong's own logic, the D.C. Circuit's
decision has increased AT&T's ability to serve local customers outside
AT&T's current cable regions without having to lease network elements
from the ILEC. Hence, since March 2001, unbundled access to the ILEC's
network elements at regulated prices no longer constitutes the "only
chance" for cable MSOs in general (and AT&T in particular) to compete
in the local services market.
97 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 50 (2002) [hereinafter Eighth Report on Video
Competition].
98 AT&T expects to begin to transition to an integrated IP packet data architecture by the
end of 2003. AT&T CORP., SEC FORM 10-K405 (Apr. 4, 2001); MERRILL LYNCH, STOCKS REMAINED
UNDER PRESSURE IN 2Q00, DESPITE SOLID FUNDAMENTALS 23 (2000).
99 Id.
100 Eighth Report on Video Competition, supra note 97, 55-58.
101 Armstrong Warns, supra note 60 (emphasis added).
102 Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001). A unit of AOL Time
Warner, the nation's second-largest cable company after AT&T, brought the case. The invalidated rule
had prohibited a company from serving more than 30% of the cable and satellite television market and
from providing more than 40% of its channels with programming from its affiliated companies.
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At a more fundamental level, Mr. Armstrong's complaint about the
FCC's cable rules and the D.C. Circuit's decision striking them down are
irrelevant. Reaching local customers through one's own facilities is
becoming commonplace for the CLECs. Although CLECs may have
originally deployed most of those facilities to target business customers,
there is no reason that the CLECs cannot extend their networks to reach
residential customers, first in denser areas and eventually elsewhere.
Indeed, FCC data from June 2001 confirm that 45.1% of all CLEC lines
serve residential and small business customers.'0 3 The FCC's data refute
Mr. Armstrong's assertion that the ILECs control the "only" route to the
local customer.
Looking to the future, cable companies offer another method of
substitution away from the ILEC as provider of network access. The
combination of Internet protocol ("IP") telephony with instant messaging
("IM") technology has the potential to create an Internet-based alternative
to the ILEC network. As soon as Microsoft and AOL Time-Warner agree
on terms for exchanging IM traffic and then add voice-over-IP as a feature
of IM, an instant private network will spring into being. It will initially
encompass millions of users, and it will exist free of regulatory obligations
or impediments. For consumers using cable modems for Internet access,
this potential source of substitution away from the ILEC network
illustrates how the competitive game has shifted from a narrowband
marketplace to a broadband one in which voice telephony is a mere
adjunct to a broader portfolio of service offerings. In that marketplace, it is
erroneous to characterize competition as a relationship solely between
ILECs and CLECs with respect to the delivery of narrowband applications.
It is all the more perverse to consider the vertical disintegration of the
ILECs as a useful public policy when the marketplace is evolving to a state
in which the ILECs' principal rivals appear to be large media companies
that are vertically integrated into both content origination and broadband
delivery.
b. Substitution from Wireless
Competitive carriers continue to expand their use of wireless
connections to reach local customers. For example, wireless carriers such
as AT&T and Sprint have used simplified rate plans to acquire former
landline consumers. 10 4 In particular, the fall in prices of regional and
national wireless plans, combined with bundled-minute offerings, has
103 LOCAL TELEPHONE UPDATE, supra note 2, at tbl.2.
104 Karissa Todd, The Rate Race, WIRELESS REV., Feb. 1, 1999, at 92.
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made wireless attractive to many consumers.'15 According to IDC, a
telecommunications consultancy, those pricing trends are driving wireline
minutes to wireless minutes, attracting new consumers, and increasing the
wireless minute usage of current consumers. 0 6 In 1999, roughly 6.5% of
the 2.1 trillion conversation minutes in the United States consisted of
wireless calls. 0 7 The Yankee Group, a technology research consultancy,
has projected that, by 2005, U.S. wireless use will grow to 41% of all
conversation minutes. 108 It attributed the phenomenon of landline
displacement to "the arrival of all-inclusive wireless phone packages
herald[ing] the arrival of cellular as a real alternative to landline
telephony."' 09 A recent study by Pulver.com, a telecommunications
consultancy, found that, "in the 16 years since the Federal
Communications Commission issued the initial cellular license, the
wireless industry has erased the twentyfold wireline price advantage that
existed in 1984," thus contributing to the landline displacement trend.," 0
The FCC has also documented the phenomenon of landline
displacement. It noted in its Sixth Report on commercial mobile services
that "[flor some, wireless service is no longer a complement to wireline
service but has become the preferred method of communication." '' In
March 1999, Leap Wireless International began offering a flat-rate mobile
plan designed to compete with wireline local telephone service." 2 By the
end of 2001, after less than three years of service, over 1.1 million
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Judy Sarles, Wireless Users Hanging Up on Landline Phones, S.F. BUS. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2001, available at http:/Asanfrancisco.bcentral.con/sanfrancisco/stories/ 2001/03/26/focus7.html.
108 Id.
109 According to the company, landline migration begins between 500 and 750 wireless
minutes of use ("MOU") for users on an all-inclusive rate plan. Id. Displacement can occur at even
lower usage levels, such as when wireless long-distance usage is high, or when users take advantage of
the large home calling area for wireless service compared with wireline service. Id.; Steve Gold,
Cellular Poised to Displace Landlines- Yankee Report, NEWSBYTES, Jan. 4, 1999; see also J. Gregory
Sidak, Hal J. Singer & David Teece, A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless
Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1639 (1999).
110 Sarles, supra note 107.
111 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial
Mobile Services, 16 F.C.C.R. 13,350, 13,381 (2001) (Sixth Report) [hereinafter Sixth Report on
Commercial Mobile Services].
112 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial
Mobile Services, 14 F.C.C.R. 10,145, 10,157-58 (1999) (Fourth Report); see also Press Release, Leap
Wireless International, Inc., Leap Wireless International Launches Cricket Service: Introducing
'Comfortable Wireless' for All Users, at http://www.leapwireless.com/press/content/1999/31799.html
(Mar. 17, 1999).
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customers had subscribed to Leap's service. 13 Surveys of Leap customers
reveal that 61% used the service as their primary telephone," 14 and,
according to Leap, roughly half of its subscribers view their wireless
phones as replacements for their first or second phone lines."' Other
wireless carriers have subsequently offered similar services that compete
for landline service. For example, in March 2000 Midwest Wireless
launched in four Minnesota communities its "Realm" service, which gives
customers one thousand minutes of local calling for a flat rate of $39.99
per month."
16
B. The Inefficiency of Mandatory Structural Separation
Even if one could document in a systematic way that discrimination
by the ILECs is undermining local competition, it does not necessarily
follow that mandatory structural separation would be an efficient remedy.
The costs of mandatory structural separation are likely to exceed any
purported benefits. A conduct remedy-for example, safeguards that
would ensure the timeliness of provisioning network elements by the
ILEC-could likely achieve the same goal in a less costly manner. Hence,
the Pennsylvania PUC erred when it initially said in 1999 that structural
separation was the "most efficient tool to ensure local telephone
competition where a large incumbent monopoly controls the market."
'"17
The definition of efficiency implies that there does not exist a lesser-cost
alternative."' But the costs associated with mandatory structural
separation are surely significant. If a behavioral remedy (applied in
conjunction with existing regulations on the ILEC's pricing of unbundled
network elements ("UNEs") and wholesale rates) can achieve the same
goal at lower costs, then mandatory structural separation cannot be the
"most efficient" tool available to regulators, contrary to the initial view of
the Pennsylvania PUC.
In March 2001, AT&T released a study that claimed that the cost of
mandatory structural separation would be small.1 9 According to the study,
113 Press Release, Leap Wireless International, Inc., Leap Reports Results for Fourth Quarter
and Fiscal Year 2001, at http://www.leapwireless.com/bcindex.html (Feb. 11, 2002).
114 See Press Release, Leap Wireless International, Inc., Leap Wireless International Reports
Results For First Quarter of Fiscal 2000 (Jan. 5, 2000) (on file with author).
115 Sixth Report on Commercial Mobile Services, supra note 111, at 13,382.
116 Press Release, Minnesota Communities Receive First-Of-Its-Kind Wireless Phone
Service (Mar. 27, 2000) (on file with author).
117 Pennsylvania Global Order, supra note 9, at 222.
118 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
TELEPHONY 23-24 (1994) (explaining Pareto efficiency).
119 Press Release, AT&T, Economist Finds Evidence Verizon is Grossly Exaggerating Cost
of State-Required Verizon Split (Mar. 8, 2001) (on file with author).
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the out-of-pocket cost of mandating structural separation of Verizon's
wholesale and retail units in Pennsylvania would not exceed $41
million."O From the outset, that analysis understated the true costs that
Verizon and other ILECs would incur."'2 The costs of mandatory structural
separation would far exceed the ILEC's out-of-pocket costs. The total
costs properly include the efficiency losses associated with vertical
fragmentation of the ILECs, as well as the administrative costs of
interpreting and enforcing a new regulatory regime.
A lengthy literature explains the efficiency reasons for vertical
integration. Every other country has integrated telecommunications
carriers for these efficiency reasons, which we now examine.
1. The Coordination of Investment and Production Decisions
Vertical integration enables a firm to coordinate investment and
production decisions across its divisions. A comparison of the costs of
contractual exchange with those of internal exchange often reveals vertical
integration to be the least-cost method of achieving the desired level of
coordination.'22 The minimization of coordination costs is extremely
important in a market subject to rapid technical change. Oliver Williamson
has noted that vertical integration will produce efficiency gains for local
exchange carriers because the telecommunications industry
operates on the technological frontier, where the unexpected upsets estab-
lished ways of doing business. Every firm knows that it must be alert to
these events; the more aggressive firms will precipitate major changes.
How best to organize production will vary among firms. There is,
nevertheless, one verity: firms that do not develop organizational and
contracting structures that keep them abreast of current and prospective
developments will fall behind. The best way for a player today to survive
and qualify as a player tomorrow is to achieve real-time responsiveness-
120 Id.
121 In addition, the $41 million figure was based on testimony that was submitted by
Verizon before the Pennsylvania PUC on a completely different subject matter-namely, appropriate
wholesale discounts. See id. ("Verizon had submitted the testimony in an effort to convince the
Commission to establish the lowest possible resale discounts for competitors who wished to compete
with Verizon by reselling Verizon service.").
122 For a review of the vast literature on transaction cost economics, see OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996); and OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985). On the application of transaction cost economics to
vertical integration, see Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, in 1
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 183, 212 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
1989). This literature, of course, descends from Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937).
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the capacity for effective and expeditious adaptation . .. . When parties
operate over long time periods in an uncertain environment, successive
adaptations of their contractual relationship will be needed. As the
contracts in question become more complex and longer in duration, and
as the interdependencies between the parties deepen, contracts give way
to common ownership with hierarchical management structures.
123
The transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing contracts make it
prohibitively costly to write contracts that specify all obligations under all
contingencies. In such circumstances, contracting parties may engage in
opportunistic behavior, which undermines the likelihood of maximizing
joint profits.
12 4
Economists have examined vertical integration in several industries
within the transactions-cost framework. To name only a few, economists
credit the coordination of investment and production decisions for
inducing vertical integration in the petroleum, 125 aluminum,126 automobile
parts, 127 and aerospace industries. 12  For example, vertical integration
increased the return to research and development by facilitating
communication between stages of production in the U.S. petroleum
industry.129 The lesson of transaction costs economics and vertical
integration applies with equal force to the decision to engage in retail
activities. A direct sales force enables a firm to provide incentives such as
security and promotion whereas outside contracting complicates such
efficiency-enhancing devices. 30 Paul Milgrom and John Roberts note:
123 Affidavit of Oliver E. Williamson 6-7, United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil
Action No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. July 3, 1994) (filed on behalf of several regional Bell operating
companies to accompany a motion to vacate the line-of-business restrictions in the Modification of
Final Judgment).
124 The classic explanation of this "hold-up" problem is Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and
Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. EcON. 426 (1976).
125 See, e.g., DAVID J. TEECE, VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND VERTICAL DIVESTITURE IN THE
U.S. OIL INDUSTRY (1976).
126 See, e.g., JOHN STUCKEY, VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND JOINT VENTURES IN THE
ALUMINUM INDUSTRY (1983).
127 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297
(1978); Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the
Automobile Industry, 13 BELL J. ECON. 206 (1982).
128 See, e.g., Scott E. Masten, The Organization of Production: Evidence from the
Aerospace Industry, 28 J.L. & ECON. 403 (1984).
129 See, e.g., Henry 0. Armour & David J. Teece, Vertical Integration and Technological
Innovations, 62 REV. ECON. & STAT. 490 (1980).
130 See, e.g., Erin Anderson & David C. Schmittlein, Integration of the Sales Force: An
Empirical Examination, 15 RAND J. ECON. 385 (1984).
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In the integrated organization, planning entails consultation between
those who sell the product, those who make it, and those who supply
parts or systems for it. Together they forecast capacity needs and identify
product improvements and investments in specialized equipment that
promise higher quality or lower production costs. If the investment is
highly specific, vertical integration alleviates the hold-up problem by
eliminating the opportunity to negotiate over the price paid to the owner
of the newly created asset."'
Relative to contracting at arm's length, vertical integration reduces these
costs.
This insight from transaction costs economics complements the more
abstract results that economists have derived from agency theory and the
organizational-incentive theory of the firm, which emphasize the effects of
information on the choice between contracting and vertical integration.'32
Daniel Spulber notes that one motivation for vertical integration is that
"[b]y exercising residual control over the firm's investments, the firm
improves monitoring of the performance of the firm's divisions ... [and]
can coordinate the activities of its divisions, separating or combining
investment projects to take advantage of new information about
performance or to realize complementarities."'"
These considerations about transaction costs and imperfect
information plainly apply to the telecommunications industry. The fact that
no RBOC has voluntarily divested its network operations from its retail
activities suggests that the costs of contractual exchange exceed the costs
of internal exchange. Moreover, as Williamson notes, the
telecommunications industry is constantly evolving, which suggests that
contracting for retail sales with an outside party would be prohibitively
expensive. Finally, the high-degree of asset specificity-for example,
dedicated capital (the loops and equipment that cannot be used in other
industries) and brand-name capital-give rise to "appropriable quasi-
rents," which implies that contracting with retail outlets could induce the
opportunistic behavior that Milgrom and Roberts note. 134 In this sense, the
telecommunications industry resembles the many other vertically
131 PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
558 (1992).
132 See, e.g., Michael H. Riordan & David E. M. Sappington, Information, Incentives, and
Organizational Mode, 102 Q.J. EcON. 243 (1987). The literature is surveyed in DANIEL F. SPULBER,
MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE: INTERMEDIARIES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 289-306 (1999).
133 Id. at 306.
134 See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 127.
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integrated industries whose structure economists have analyzed from the
perspective of transaction costs.
2. Accountability for Product Quality
Quality assurance is a significant benefit from vertical integration in
the telecommunications industry. Vertical integration is a response to the
difficulty of reliably specifying and measuring contractual performance.'35
Professor Armen Alchian explains: "Sometimes it may be too costly to
determine the quality of one of the inputs objectively, and if the quality of
the input cannot be costlessly inferred from the quality of the finished
product, vertical integration can align [the companies'] interests better."'
13 6
A cost of vertical separation is the loss of a single point of accountability.
It is difficult for a customer to hold multiple vendors accountable for some
form of product failure. Without this single point of accountability,
consumers are left "calling firms' service departments and searching for
the party responsible for the failure."' 37
3. Bundled Offerings
Vertical integration allows firms to combine final services. The
question is not whether consumers are incapable of bundling end services
on their own. Clearly, they can do so, but at a cost. The relevant question,
rather, is whether firms or consumers are the more efficient integrators of
services and functionalities. 38  It would seem self-evident in a
technologically dynamic market such as telecommunications that firms are
the more efficient integrators. If that assumption is correct, then, for
similar reasons, a vertically integrated retailer would have an inherent cost
advantage over a non-integrated retailer when offering consumers a bundle
of complementary telecommunications functionalities or services.
Mandatory structural separation would erase the ILECs' cost advantage as
integrators of telecommunications services, which, as we explain more
fully in Part IV, explains the appeal of this regulatory intervention to the
CLECs.
If there were not significant efficiencies from vertical integration in
the provision of telecommunications services, the interexchange carriers
135 See Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration and Regulation in the Telephone Industry, 16
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 323, 323-26 (1995).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 325.
138 J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30-
31, 45-46, 68-69 (2001) (discussing whether the consumer or the producer is the lower-cost integrator
of software functionalities).
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(which, today, are the largest CLECs) would not have acquired or built
their own fiber rings in metropolitan markets,1 39 nor would they have
acquired cable MSOs and wireless carriers or spectrum licenses.
Professors Michael T. Maloney and Robert E. McCormick found empirical
evidence in the mid-1990s of the value of vertically integrated
telecommunications services. They performed an event study of the
announcement of MCI's decision to enter the local market and the
announcement of AT&T's acquisition of McCaw Cellular, then the largest
wireless carrier. 140 They found that vertical corporate alignments between
interexchange carriers and wireless carriers produced positive abnormal
returns for the companies involved, I4 1 whereas the RBOCs, which at the
time could not engage in such integration because of the line-of-business
restrictions in the MFJ,142 experienced substantial negative abnormal
returns. 43 This finding suggests the kind of loss in market value that
mandatory structural separation would likely impose on the ILECs, a
substantial portion of which would surely translate into diminished
consumer welfare because of lost productive efficiencies.
Professors Maloney and McCormick also emphasized the high costs
of billing, which can be spread across multiple services through vertical
integration.' 44 By bundling services and billing on a monthly or annual
fixed fee, a vertically integrated carrier could significantly reduce its
billing costs. 45 Negotiating contracts to allocate the revenues shared
between companies that supply different portions of the billed services
146would eliminate those cost savings. Structural separation of the ILECs
would necessitate the negotiation of such contracts.
4. The Division of Indivisible Assets
The vertically integrated ILECs have significant capital in intangible
assets such as customer loyalty and goodwill. For example, Verizon
139 See Alchian, supra note 135, at 326; see also Michael T. Maloney & Robert E.
McCormick, Realignment in Telecommunications, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 401 (1995).
140 Id. at 423 n.20.
141 Maloney and McCormick found that the combined portfolio of AT&T and McCaw
Cellular gained 4.04%, or $2.52 billion, over the two-day merger event window, while the value of the
RBOCs fell by 1.92%, or $2.53 billion. Id. at 408. For the second event, MCI's value rose by $608
million, or 4.41%, on its announcement, while the combined value of the RBOCs fell by $7.97 billion,
or 4.88%. Id. at 412-13.
142 See PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO ESTABLISH
COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICES 196-200 (1996).
143 Maloney & McCormick, supra note 139, at 417-18.
144 Id. at 419.
145 Id.
146 See id.
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reported $41.9 billion in intangible assets as of December 2000,147
including goodwill, wireless licenses, and customer bases.148 Mandatory
structural separation would force the ILECs to allocate indivisible or
intangible assets of local operating companies across its new subsidiaries.
But there is no obvious way to divide indivisible, intangible assets such as
intellectual property and brand names. Under mandatory structural
separation, would Verizon's wholesale company or retail company own
the rights to use the Verizon name in a particular state? Or would both
companies share the right? Could regulators lawfully deny Verizon's retail
company the use of its own brand name (as state PUCs have considered
ordering in restructuring proceedings to affect retail competition in the
electric power industryl49)? Merely to pose such questions is to underscore
the inherent inefficiency of dividing assets that a firm uses in common
across two or more of its productive sequences and which, therefore, give
rise to economies of scope.
5. Enforcement Costs
Structural remedies have substantial enforcement costs, particularly in
technologically dynamic network industries.' 50 The most pertinent
example is the AT&T divestiture, which was a federal antitrust case rather
than an FCC proceeding.'' As noted earlier, the MFJ prohibited the
RBOCs from providing interLATA long-distance service and from
147 VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., 2001 SEC FORM 10-K405, at F-24 (Mar. 23, 2001).
148 Id. at F-28.
149 See, e.g., Application of Pennsylvania Electric Company for Approval of Restructuring
Plan Under Section 2806 of the Public Utility Code, No. R-00974009, R-00974009C0001, R-
00974009C0002, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, June 30, 1998, 1998 Pa. PUC LEXIS 162 (opinion and
order). With respect to the restructuring of an electric utility into a generation company and an electric
distribution company ("EDC"), the Pennsylvania PUC rejected a
proposed bar on the ability of affiliated suppliers or divisions to use the EDC brand name in
marketing. We are not inclined to impose this restriction .... [Ain EDC may not allow its
competitive affiliate to use its name to suggest that the EDC would provide better
distribution services if power is purchased from its affiliate. Similarly, it would be
inappropriate for the competitive affiliate to use the EDC name to indicate that supply
purchased from other competitors may be less reliable or that the generation services are in
fact being provided by the EDC. We continue to believe that an absolute bar on the
competitive affiliate's use of the EDC brand name in marketing is not necessary or
desirable. Rather, we are satisfied that restrictions on the manner in which the EDC brand
name is used by the competitive affiliate are sufficient to ensure a level playing field among
market participants.
Id. at *322-*23 (citation omitted).
150 See Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act
Monopolization Cases, 80 OR. L. REv. 109 (2001); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak,
Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 6-15 (2001).
151 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) [hereinafter Modification of Final Judgment].
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manufacturing telecommunications equipment. But what constituted
"manufacturing" or "interLATA transport"? Defining such terms and
enforcing the entry restrictions based upon them invited strategic use of
litigation by the parties to the decree. The social costs of that strategic
litigation were surely profound, particularly in light of the rapid
technological change occurring in telecommunications at the time.
l" 2
The litigation over the MFJ is a vivid example of the subversion of
the antitrust process for rent-seeking objectives. The experience illustrates
that structural remedies that incorporate supervisory and behavioral
elements can be costly. The point holds regardless of whether the
structural remedy is styled as regulation or antitrust. 153 In particular, the
MFJ provided a waiver process by which the RBOCs could request the
court's permission to enter new markets. Under Section VIII(C) of the
decree, the RBOCs were entitled to have a particular line-of-business
restriction lifted if they could show that "there [was] no substantial
possibility" that a BOC could use its monopoly power to impede
competition in the market that it proposed to enter. 54 But the waiver
process was painfully slow.l55 The ostensibly straightforward AT&T
consent decree, in fact, became a suffocating layer of new regulation for
the telecommunications industry. 156
C. The Inefficacy of Mandatory Structural Separation
Even if one accepts, for the sake of argument, that anticompetitive
behavior by the ILECs has been responsible for the failure of certain
152 See Hausman & Sidak, supra note 81, at 428-29 (documenting delay in court rulings on
requested waivers of the line-of-business restrictions).
153 Skepticism of mandatory structural separation is also justified on the basis of the limited
success of divestiture remedies secured by the government, under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in
numerous cases outside the telecommunications industry in which courts found that a firm or groups of
firms had monopolized a market. The conventional wisdom is that in most of these cases the structural
remedies were at least partially successful in restoring competition. In actuality, little evidence
supports such a view. See Crandall, supra note 150; Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 150, at 39-57.
Indeed, in most cases the available evidence does not enable one to conclude that the court-imposed
relief had its intended effect, or that a less costly behavioral remedy would not have been as
efficacious.
154 Modification of Final Judgment, supra note 151, § VIII(C).
155 In 1993, the average waiver request had been pending for thirty-six months even though
the Department of Justice opposed relief in only four of the 266 requests. See Paul H. Rubin & Hashem
Dezhbakhsh, Costs of Delay and Rent-Seeking Under the Modification of Final Judgment, 16
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 385, 385-87 (1995). By 1994, the backlog period had grown to 54.7
months, although the court approved 96% of the waiver requests. Id. at 387-89.
156 See MACAVOY, supra note 142; J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION
OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1997).
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CLECs, it does not follow that mandatory structural separation would be
an efficacious remedy.
1. The Absence of Systematic Evidence of Discrimination
It is not clear how mandatory structural separation would protect
against any allegedly discriminatory practices by the ILECs in the
provisioning of UNEs or the transferring of resale customers. Such a
prescription is not supported by any evidence. Before regulators can
design a policy to deter "discrimination" against CLECs, the CLECs ought
to produce credible evidence that discrimination exists. Neither AT&T nor
any other CLEC had documented any systematic abuse by an ILEC in
provisioning facilities. A collection of anecdotes concerning the timeliness
of provisioning does not amount to systematic evidence of discrimination
against the CLECs.
For example, the Pennsylvania PUC did not chronicle any systematic
evidence of discrimination in its early decision to mandate structural
separation.157 The closest example of "discrimination" that the
Pennsylvania PUC described in its Global Order concerned the timeliness
in the provisioning of collocation by Verizon's local operating company,
Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania ("BA-PA"):
Significant delays in providing collocation can severely hamper the
operations of CLECs and delay competition in Pennsylvania. BA-PA's
Tariff No. 218 establishes a "standard interval" for physical collocation
of 120 business days, or nearly six (6) months calendar time. This is an
inordinately long period. In their petitions in this proceeding, BA-PA and
the CLECs suggest a ninety (90)-day provisioning interval. [Accelerated
Connections Inc.] has recommended that this Commission adopt a sixty
(60) calendar-day interval for traditional physical collocation and thirty
(30) calendar days for cageless or common collocation arrangements.
158
The PUC eventually decided that Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania should
"provide for a ninety (90)-calendar-day maximum provisioning interval
from the date BA-PA receives a deposit on collocation space from a CLEC
to the date when BA-PA's work is completed."
'' 59
If the Pennsylvania PUC can directly control the timeliness of the
ILEC's provision of collocation down to the number of days, then why is
mandatory structural separation necessary to ensure the ILEC's
157 Pennsylvania Global Order, supra note 9, § XVI.
158 Id. at 92 (internal citation omitted).
159 Id.
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nondiscriminatory treatment of the CLECs? Plainly, the Pennsylvania
commission already wields a more finely tuned policy instrument.
2. The Ability of Behavioral Restraints to Prevent Discrimination
Even a vertically integrated local service provider might find it more
profitable to use resellers to reach niche markets than to address those
markets by itself, particularly if the wholesale prices are set at appropriate
levels. Hence, in addition to bearing the burden to show systematic
evidence that discrimination has actually occurred, the CLECs ought to
show that the ILEC benefits from the discrimination and that a structurally
separate wholesaler of network access would have different incentives
with respect to the treatment of the CLECs.
Finally, if discrimination against CLECs were the problem that
AT&T claims, then why have the ILECs not employed it to disadvantage
their wireless rivals? The market shares of non-BOC wireless carriers
(52%) represent undisputable evidence of a lack of discrimination by
RBOCs against unaffiliated wireless rivals. 60 Even if it wanted to
discriminate, a vertically integrated cellular or personal communications
services ("PCS") provider that owned a local exchange network could not
do so because regulators closely monitor interconnection rates. As a result,
the ILECs have not used wireless-to-wireline interconnection in a
discriminatory fashion against unaffiliated PCS providers or unaffiliated
CLECs. There is no empirical evidence that its integrated position has
allowed the ILEC's affiliated wireless carrier to obtain a larger market
share than its unintegrated rivals.161 It is premature to devise remedies for a
problem that has not been shown to exist.
3. The Inability of Mandatory Structural Separation to Lower
Wholesale Discounts
With respect to lowering wholesale discounts, Mr. Armstrong's
comparison of mandatory structural separation of the RBOCs to the AT&T
divestiture is flawed for at least four reasons. First, the consent decree in
the government's divestiture case against the Bell System did not require
AT&T to separate its wholesale long-distance business from its retail long-
distance business. Rather, the MFJ mandated divestiture of the local-
160 Sixth Report on Commercial Mobile Services, supra note 111, app. C, tbl.3. Market
shares are for end of year 2000.
161 See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Empirical Tests of the Cross-Subsidy and Discriminatory
Access Hypotheses in Vertically Integrated Telephony, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 493
(1995).
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exchange facilities of the former Bell System from its long-distance
facilities; further, it prohibited, among other things, the RBOCs from
providing long-distance service from one local access and transport area
("LATA") to another, and from manufacturing telecommunications
equipment. 162 Hence, the decline in wholesale rates charged by AT&T to
unaffiliated long-distance resellers cannot possibly be attributed to the
structural separation (indeed, the complete divestiture) of the former Bell
System.
163
Second, when judging the competitiveness of a market, regulators and
legislators should be more concerned about the margins between prices
and incremental costs than about the size of discounts available from those
prices. Professor Paul W. MacAvoy has found that the price-cost margins
earned by the three major long-distance providers on discount plans were
increasing during the 1990s-that is, discount plans did not push margins
down.' 64 Moreover, the cost of marketing long-distance services is a large
share of any carrier's (including AT&T's) total costs. Therefore, wholesale
discounts are likely to bulk large in these services. Mr. Armstrong surely
recognizes that the ILECs' rates for local exchange service are not
significantly above long-run marginal costs-if indeed those rates even
cover costs for large segments of customers. 1 s Until costs are properly
taken into account, it does not make sense to compare discounts on prices
across two different products-long-distance and local exchange.
Third, the Pennsylvania PUC recently demonstrated that mandatory
structural separation of the ILECs is not necessary to lower the regulated
wholesale rates in the local services market. On March 22, 2001, the
Pennsylvania PUC ordered a 4.4% reduction in the unbundled loop rate in
density zone four, which covers most rural areas of the state.' 66 Because
the Pennsylvania PUC has the discretion to increase the ILEC's resale
discount and lower the price of its unbundled loop, the entire question of
mandatory structural separation remains irrelevant to lowering the ILEC's
wholesale rates.
Fourth, it defies the economic logic of input pricing to suppose that
mandatory structural separation would lower the prices charged a CLEC
162 Modification of Final Judgment, supra note 151, at 226-34. See generally MICHAEL K.
KELLOGG, JOHN THORNE & PETER W. HUBER, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 199-248
(1992).
163 For an economic analysis of the AT&T divestiture and its aftermath, see ROBERT W.
CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE COMPETITIVE ERA (1991).
164 MacAvoy, supra note 94, at 305; see also MACAVOY, supra note 142.
165 See generally CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 92, at 166 (discussing regulatory
requirements to price local exchange service below cost).
166 Pa. PUC Orders Functional Separation of Verizon, Not Full Breakup, COMM. DAILY,
Mar. 23, 2001; Pennsylvania Global Order, supra note 9.
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by a hypothetically unregulated ILEC.167 Simply splitting the wholesale
and retail operations of a firm would not eliminate the market power of the
wholesale unit with respect to rival retail firms. If one assumes, as AT&T
alleges, that an ILEC has monopoly power in local exchange services, then
it necessarily follows that the wholesale division of that ILEC would have
monopoly power in the nonsubstitutable wholesale inputs required to
produce local exchange services. (Certainly, retailing inputs are not a
source of monopoly power.) Basic price theory implies that the
(unregulated) wholesale division would charge all retailers (each in effect
would be unaffiliated after mandatory structural separation) the monopoly
price for the input. 168 But integrated or not, an ILEC obviously does not
unilaterally set the wholesale prices at which it sells inputs to competitors.
To the contrary, those wholesale prices are regulated rates that must
receive the prior approval of a state PUC pursuant to its duties under
Section 252(d)(3) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.169 How could
mandatory structural separation possibly lower regulated wholesale rates
that are set according to TELRIC-based prices or the avoided cost of
retailing? Mr. Armstrong does not provide an answer.
170
4. The Unsatisfactory or Inconclusive Experience with Structural
Separation
The experience with structural separation has been unsatisfactory or
inconclusive. The FCC has mandated structural separation in several
situations that are distinguishable from local exchange
167 See BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 118; SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 143, at 20;
William J. Baumol, Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Parity Pricing and Its Critics: A Necessary
Condition for Efficiency in the Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitors, 14 YALE J. ON REG.
145 (1997); William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11
YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1994).
168 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 182 (1988).
169 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(3) (2002) ("Wholesale prices for telecommunications services.-For
the purposes of Section 251 (c)(4), a State commission shall determine wholesale rates on the basis of
retail rates charged to subscribers for the telecommunications service requested, excluding the portion
thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the
local exchange carrier.").
170 As Professor Jean Tirole notes, a competitive retail sector for local service would push
down retail rates to their marginal cost, which happens to be the monopoly input price plus the
retailing costs of a non-facilities-based lessee of ILEC facilities. TIROLE, supra note 168, at 182. Stated
differently, the classic double-marginalization problem disappears because downstream competition
eliminates the second margin. Unfortunately, under reasonable assumptions, the retail price under
vertical disintegration and downstream competition may exceed the retail price under vertical
integration. For example, any differentiation among retail firms could allow the (partial) return of the
double-marginalization problem-that is, when consumers have different tastes or are located in
different areas, retail local services firms would have the ability to add a second margin to the
wholesaler's (monopoly) price. Id.
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telecommunications. The same agency has tried and rejected mandatory
structural separation in another setting.
a. The American Experience with the AT& T Divestiture and
the Canadian Alternative
It is often assumed that competition in the U.S. long-distance market
could not develop until Judge Harold Greene dismembered AT&T,
separating the local "bottleneck" facilities from the long-distance and
manufacturing operations in the 1982 antitrust decree. But vertical
divestiture-the ultimate form of structural separation-was not necessary
to accomplish this result. No other country has forced such vertical
divestiture on its incumbent telephone company. For example, the Canadian
regulatory and competition authorities did not attempt to force vertical
divestiture on the Canadian incumbents-Bell Canada, TELUS, BC Tel
(now part of TELUS), MT&T, Island Telephone, and NewTel. Despite the
fact that all continue to offer both local and long-distance service, long-
distance competition has developed more rapidly in Canada than in the
United States.17'
The Canadian approach to facilitating entry relies not on structural
separation but on simple equal-access requirements for competitive
carriers. The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Regulatory Commission ("CRTC") learned from a critical U.S. error-the
failure of regulators to mandate equal access to local switches. The FCC
had such an opportunity in 1969 (when MCI was first allowed to enter as a
private-line carrier), in 1971 (when private-line entry was allowed
generally), and in 1977 (when the courts pried open all long-distance
services), but the agency declined to take them. Equal access for all long-
distance carriers became a reality only when it was mandated by the 1982
decree that broke up AT&T and was subsequently extended to non-Bell
local exchange companies by the FCC. Compliance was generally not
achieved until 1986-87, more than a decade after MCI began offering
ordinary (switched) long-distance service. In contrast, the CRTC required
that incumbent carriers provide equal access to all certified entrants in its
1992 order opening the long-distance market to competition. This
requirement would quickly unleash long-distance competition.
The United States began to admit competition into long-distance
services nearly twenty-five years ago. Canada began much more recently,
171 This discussion is based on a more extensive analysis of U.S. and Canadian competition
in Robert W. Crandall & Thomas W. Hazlett, Telecommunications Policy Reform in the United States
and Canada, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALIZATION ON Two SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC 8 (Martin
Cave & Robert W. Crandall eds., 2001).
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waiting until 1992 to allow facilities-based competition. Nevertheless,
Canada's long-distance market is now at least as competitive as that of the
United States. The U.S. long-distance market has become much less
concentrated since MCI ventured forth in the mid-1970s. Because U.S.
local carriers were not required to offer equal access to long-distance
carriers until AT&T was broken up by consent decree, most analyses of
U.S. long-distance competition begin with 1984.
Despite its late start, long-distance competition in Canada is well
advanced. Spared from the contentious court debates that clouded the U.S.
environment and proceeding much more deliberately in implementing
equal access, the Canadians have avoided much of the transition required
in the United States to move from monopoly to a more competitive
market. Indeed, because Canada did not pursue vertical divestiture, the
incumbent local companies are aggressive competitors with a shadow
price of access that is equal to marginal cost. Within six years of Canada's
long-distance decision, the incumbent companies had lost about 35% of
their market shares. In the United States, AT&T's market share fell from
84% of interstate minutes in the third quarter of 1984 to 65% in 1989, five
years after divestiture and about fourteen years after MCI began to offer
switched long-distance service. These results suggest that an equal-access
regime without divestiture can work well to assure entry into long-distance
services.
Ultimately, any judgment about the degree of competition is based on
the proximity of rates to incremental cost. Access charges are now similar
in Canada and the United States, yet Canadian long-distance rates have
fallen below those in the United States. Equal access and the ability of the
incumbent local carriers to compete aggressively appear to be sufficient to
generate results that now surpass those in the United States more than
twenty years after MCI began offering switched long-distance service.
This result strongly suggests that it was not vertical divestiture, but equal
access, that created the environment for long-distance competition.
b. Advanced Services
The FCC has imposed structural separation for "advanced services"
supplied by ILECs, which the agency defines as "wireline, broadband
telecommunications services, such as services that rely on digital
subscriber line technology (commonly referred to as xDSL) and packet-
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switched technology.""17 The alternative to operating a separate advanced
services subsidiary is not that the ILEC is barred from supplying advanced
services; rather, the advanced services supplied by the ILEC would be
subject to the existing regulation applicable to ILECs. For this reason, the
FCC calls the separate subsidiary for advanced services an "optional
alternative pathway for incumbent LECs that would allow separate
affiliates to provide advanced services free from incumbent LEC
regulation.' '173 The FCC deems such an affiliate to be exempt from
unbundling obligations and would be considered nondominant, such that it
would be exempt from price-cap or rate-of-return regulation and the
obligation to file tariffs.
174
Several factors distinguish the FCC's policy on advanced-services
separate affiliates from the proposals for mandatory structural separation
of the ILECs. First, the policy is voluntary and offers a quid pro quo. In
return for grouping its newer, broadband services in a separate affiliate, the
ILEC receives regulatory relief and thus reduces uncertainty concerning
the returns to investment in broadband technology. This form of separation
may nonetheless impose costs of the sort described above, but it is the
ILEC's decision whether those costs are greater or less than the costs
associated with unbundling requirements and dominant-carrier regulation.
Second, because advanced services are, by definition, more
technologically advanced than narrowband services (such as traditional
voice telephony), the ILEC may have fewer sunk costs at risk from
structural separation of the former compared with structural separation of
the existing local network into retail and wholesale entities. That is not to
say, of course, that advanced services will require a high degree of
coordination of production and investment. The separate-affiliate
requirement may distort investment choices away from technologies
having high sunk costs to those having relatively less sunkeness in their
cost structures.
Third, given the substantial lead that cable modems have over DSL
services supplied by ILECs, it is questionable whether the separate-
affiliate path for advanced services has produced its intended benefits. As
of early 2002, DSL appears to be losing the race.
75
172 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13
F.C.C.R. 24,011, 3, at 24,014 (1998) (memorandum opinion and order and notice of proposed
rulemaking).
173 Id. 19, at 24,020.
174 Id.
175 See Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Cable Modems and DSL:
Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers, 91 AM. ECON. ASS'N PAPERS & PROC. 302
(2001); Jerry A. Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer, Residential Demand for Broadband
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c. Wireless
The FCC requires ILECs to establish structurally separate affiliates
for wireless services. This requirement, however, is distinguishable from
mandatory structural separation on several grounds. First, it is easier to
segregate the assets necessary to provide wireless service from those
necessary to provide local wireline service than it is to separate supposedly
"wholesale" wireline assets from supposedly "retail" wireline assets.
Second, the separation of wireless from wireline operations served the
strategic objectives of ILECs in the sense that wireless had very different
characteristics of demand growth and capital investment from those of the
wireline network. Accordingly, as the voluntary divestiture of AirTouch
from Pacific Telesis attests, there were efficiencies in presenting a "pure
play" to the capital markets. There is no realistic expectation that
mandatory structural separation of the ILECs would unleash unexploited
opportunities for the superior capitalization of local exchange carriers.
d. Voluntary and Unsolicited Plans for Structural Separation
One American telephone company attempted a form of structural
separation before the Telecommunications Act of 1996. A large foreign
telecommunications company has rebuffed unsolicited offers to buy its
local network infrastructure. Both experiences are instructive and
underscore why current proposals for mandatory structural separation are
unlikely to increase economic welfare.
i. Voluntary Structural Separation: Rochester Telephone
In February 1993, Rochester Telephone filed a proposal with the New
York State Public Service Commission ("NYPSC") to open its Rochester,
New York local exchange market to competition. After seven months of
public hearings, the NYPSC approved a joint stipulation outlining
Rochester Telephone's voluntary structural separation. 176 The joint
Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 YALE
J. ON REG. 129 (2001).
176 See Petition of Rochester Telephone Corporation for Approval of Proposed Restructuring
Plan, Petition of Rochester Telephone Corporation for Approval of a New Multi Year Rate Stability
Agreement, Case 93-C-0103, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Nov. 10, 1994, 1994 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 64, *3
[hereinafter Rochester Restructuring Order]. Signatories to the joint stipulation were Rochester
Telephone, the Department of Public Service staff, Time Warner Communications, the
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, the New York State Telephone Association, the
New York State Department of Economic Development, and the Public Utility Law Project of New
York.
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stipulation established an "Open Market Plan" ("OMiP") with two major
components. First, the Open Market Plan "reinvented" Rochester
Telephone by creating (1) a holding company (Frontier Corporation) that
controlled the stock in each of Rochester Telephone's newly created
subsidiaries, (2) a regulated ILEC (Rochester Telephone Corporation, or
"RTC"), and (3) a "lightly" regulated CLEC (Frontier
Telecommunications of Rochester, or "FTR"). Second, the joint stipulation
drafted a regulatory plan for the period January 1, 1995 through December
31, 2001.177 The regulatory plan addressed rates (including a revenue
requirement), service quality (network and customer service), and
enhancement of competition. On January 1, 1995, Frontier
Communications began operating as the umbrella corporation for its
structurally separated telecommunications subsidiaries. The holding
company hoped that its voluntary restructuring would position the
company to compete in "the market on our own terms. 178
In its 1994 Rochester Restructuring Order, the NYPSC said that it
generally opposed holding company reorganization efforts because they
make complex regulatory processes even more unruly. 179 The NYPSC
knew that its approval of Rochester Telephone's voluntary structural
separation would lead to lengthy regulatory proceedings, but it also hoped
the expected procompetitive benefits of the reorganization would outweigh
the costs. After numerous reconsiderations of its rate-setting procedures
for regulated holding companies, however, the NYPSC became frustrated:
"[T]he joint stipulation and agreement embodying the Open Market Plan is
a complex, interrelated package that allowed FTR to form a holding
company, a request that was denied many times in the past."'80
The structural separation plan soon encountered difficulties. In 1996
and 1997, Frontier failed to meet the minimum acceptable service quality
177 Id. at *1 I-*12; see also INGO VOGELSANG & BRIDGER M. MITCHELL,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION: THE LAST TEN MILES 194 (1997) (FTR "provid[es] retail
services in competition with other companies and buy[s] wholesale services from Rochester Telephone
at regulated prices. Local competitors are thus able to select services from Rochester Telephone and
combine them with their own service elements and equipment."). One of the authors of this Article
supplied an affidavit with Alfred E. Kahn on behalf of Rochester Telephone, supporting the plan.
178 Vince Vittore, Rochester Tel: Blueprint for Change, 99 TEL. ENG'R & MGMT. 24 (1995)
(quoting Paul Solinski, Rochester Telephone's corporate planning and regulatory policy director).
179 Rochester Restructuring Order, supra note 176, at "15-*16 ("In the past, we have favored
holding company ownership of a utility only in limited circumstances, particularly where the utility is
small and benefits from affiliation with others through increased ability to raise capital and increased
opportunity for cost savings through economics of scale. In general, however, we have concluded that
stand-alone operation of a utility is superior to a holding company structure.").
180 Complaint of AT&T Corp., Opinion and Order on Unbundled Network Elements
Thoroughfare Guide, and Legal Services Petition, Case 95-C-0657, at 7-8, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
July 22, 1999.
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measurements established by the Open Market Plan. 81 The NYPSC levied
more than $1 million in fines against Frontier Telephone for missing its
performance benchmarks. 2
Voluntary structural separation does not mean that CLECs will desist
from seeking large wholesale discounts from ILECs. When the NYPSC
approved Rochester Telephone's restructuring plan, the commission
approved the company's wholesale discount rate of 5%.183 However, the
NYPSC noted that the 5% wholesale discount rate was "a starting point,"
and the commission invited comments on the appropriateness of its pricing
structure.8 4 In 1996, after receiving numerous complaints and petitions
from CLECs, the NYPSC revised Rochester Telephone's wholesale
discount rate to 13.5%.18 AT&T continued to protest that Rochester
Telephone's wholesale discounts were still too low: AT&T submitted an
avoided-cost study and requested wholesale discount rates between 20.4
and 24.5%.186 After accepting AT&T's cost study, the NYPSC again
increased Rochester's wholesale discount rates to 17% if it provided
operator services and 19.6% if the reseller provided operator services.8 7
Voluntary structural separation also does not mean that it will be
easier for CLECs to move local telephony customers from the ILEC. In its
Local Competition First Report and Order, the FCC explained how
Rochester Telephone's structural separation complicated the
implementation of the resale requirements in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996:
AT&T and TCC commented on AT&T's experience in the Rochester,
New York market as a reseller of Rochester Telephone's services under
Rochester Telephone's Open Market Plan. Parties noted that AT&T was
required to submit a detailed order form, initially through a facsimile
machine and later through e-mail, in order to resell Rochester Telephone
services. AT&T asserts that it was signing up between one and two
hundred new customers daily and therefore had to fax up to 1400 pages
daily to Rochester Telephone. AT&T and TCC contend that such a
181 Petition of Rochester Telephone Corp., Order Approving Proposed Modifications to the
Open Market Plan, Case 93-C-0103, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Oct. 16, 1998.
182 Petition of Rochester Telephone Corp. for Approval of a New Multiyear Rate Stability
Agreement, Case 93-C-0033, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Nov. 6, 1997 (Order Directing Rebates).
183 Id. at 34-35.
184 Id. at27.
185 Petition of Rochester Telephone Corp. for Approval of a Proposed Restructuring Plan,
Case 93-C-0103, Opinion No. 96-19, at 21, N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, July 18, 1996.
186 Complaint of AT&T Communications of New York, Inc., Case 95-C-0657, Opinion No.
96-30, at 20, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Nov. 27, 1996.
187 Id. at I.
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manual process is clearly discriminatory and in violation of the 1996 Act
because it creates additional delay and the potential for human error,
resulting in customer dissatisfaction. TCC argues further that such a
disparity in systems allows for the incumbent LEC to schedule service
commencement and issue new phone numbers during the initial contact
with a customer, while the competitor, at best, must put the customer on
hold while it calls the incumbent LEC to obtain such information.1
88
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that structural separation of
Rochester Telephone did nothing to eliminate the need for more efficient
processes for transferring customers from the ILEC to the CLEC. This
issue, of course, emerged after the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as the
principal complaint upon which AT&T and others opposed Bell company
entry into in-region interLATA long-distance service: AT&T asserted that
the BOC's systems for switching local customers to CLECs were
inadequate. Yet, by April 2002, the state PUCs and the FCC had
authorized BOC entry in ten states 189 -and in none of those cases had the
BOC structurally separated its local exchange operations into wholesale
and retail entities. Clearly, Rochester Telephone's experience
demonstrated that structural separation was neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for expeditious CLEC entry.
Before the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Rochester's joint stipulation imposed limited unbundling requirements on
the company: "The only specific network elements the OMP requires FTR
to make available to telecommunications carriers are links and ports."' 90
After the 1996 legislation, a large part of the company's agreement with
the NYPSC was rendered moot because the Telecommunications Act
significantly lengthened the list of network elements that Rochester was
obliged to provide to CLECs on an unbundled basis.
Rochester Telephone's structural separation was primarily premised
on the enhancement of competition. However, six years later the NYPSC
observed that "competition ha[d] yet to develop to any noticeable
extent."' 9' Rochester's experiment with voluntary structural separation
188 Local Competition First Report and Order, supra note 96, 508, at 15,754-55 (footnotes
omitted).
189 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
190 N.Y. DEPT. PUB. SERV., STAFF REPORT ON FRONTIER TELEPHONE OF ROCHESTER INC.'S
UNBUNDLED NETWORK ELEMENTS, THOROUGHFARE GUIDE, AND LEGAL SERVICES PETITION 3 (Apr.
20, 1998).
191 Petition of Rochester Telephone Corporation for Approval of Multi-Year Rate Stability
Agreement, Case 93-C-0033, 93-C-0103, N. Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm'n.
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ended when Global Crossing bought the company in 1999.192 That
experiment suggests that voluntary structural separation is not efficacious
for developing competition in local telephony.
ii. Unsolicited Private Proposals for Structural Separation:
Offers for BT (British Telecom)
In addition to government-mandated structural separation and strictly
voluntary structural separation, a third alternative has arisen. A third party
can present an unsolicited proposal for corporate reorganization. The
proposal could take the form of an unsolicited offer to buy an ILEC's
network infrastructure, or it could take the form of an unsolicited corporate
control transaction that would subsequently affect a strategy of structural
separation or divestiture.
In the United Kingdom, British Telecom ("BT") received two
separate and unsolicited offers in 2001 to divest its fixed-line business.
Since Oftel, the U.K. telecommunications regulator, began requiring BT to
unbundle its local loops in November 1999, BT's competitors have
complained that BT has been slow to open its loops. 193 Despite mounting
regulatory pressure to accelerate its local loop unbundling ("LLU") efforts,
and despite mounting debt, BT rejected both offers to exit the wholesale
telecommunications business altogether.
194
At the end of July 2001, a United States-based consortium offered
British Telecom £8 billion to buy BT's local loops through a bid vehicle
called Earthlease. 95 Oftel endorsed Earthlease's proposal because the
consortium promised to invest £500 million annually for at least seven
years to accelerate the deployment of broadband services.1 96 BT rejected
Earthlease's bid.19 7 Less than one week after BT rejected Earthlease's
offer, BT received an unsolicited buyout proposal from West LB, a state-
192 See Joint Petition of Global Crossing, Ltd., and Frontier Corp., Case 99-C-0530, N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Dec. 1, 1999 (order approving petition).
193 See Oftel, Determination under Condition 83.27 of Schedule 1 to the Public
Telecommunications Licence Granted to British Telecommunications PLC Concerning the Entry into
Force of the Condition "Requirement to Provide Access Network Facilities," Aug. 8, 2001 (explaining
local loop unbundling progress and problems).
194 See Jon Ashworth, Second Approach on BT's Fixed-Line Network, TIMES OF LONDON,
Aug. 6, 2001, at 22. In mid 2001, Oftel was considering reducing BT's wholesale rates by more than
70%. Jamie Doward, BT Eyed Network Sell-Off, OBSERVER, Aug. 5, 2001, at 2 (noting that Oftel has
invited BT's rival operators to suggest what they believe is a fair price for unbundled loop rentals;
proposals range from BT's current charge of £6.17 per month per line to £1.50 per month).
195 Doward, supra note 194, at 2.
196 Ofrel Meets With Earthlease, EVENING STANDARD, Aug. 2, 2001, at 38.
197 Simon Goodley, German Move for BT Fixed-Line Arm Network Group has £12bn in
Annual Revenues, DAILY TEL. LONDON, Aug. 6, 2001, at 32.
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owned German investment bank. 9 West LB offered to buy BT's entire
fixed-line infrastructure for £18 billion, including £5 billion in cash. 99 BT
declined.
If BT had accepted Earthlease's bid, BT would have lost its "last
mile" of wires connecting its 28 million customers to its local exchanges.
One BT executive said "the local loop [is] . . .the core business of BT.
And... you don't outsource your core business. 2 °0 If BT had divested its
local loops, the company would have had to negotiate interoperability
standards and an interconnection agreement with Earthlease.
Alternatively, if BT had accepted West LB's offer, BT would have
had to buy capacity over its old lines, thus leaving BT as a disintegrated
retailer of telecommunications services. The West LB proposal would
have been less complex to effectuate because BT could have sold its entire
fixed-line network as a single entity, but it nevertheless would have been
difficult to value an entire network infrastructure. Industry analysts'
estimates of the value of BT's network varied widely, but the average
estimate exceeded West LB's price by more than £5 billion.20 ' BT
evidently concluded that unsolicited proposals for divestiture would not
adequately compensate the company for the value of infrastructure assets
and the costs associated with dismantling its integrated business.
iii. Regulatory Divestiture, or "Velvet Divorce"
One of us has previously examined the incentives for ILECs
voluntarily to undertake structural separation.20 2 Sidak suggested at an
American Enterprise Institute conference in August 1997 that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 had been a failure with respect to its
local and long-distance entry provisions, and that one scenario that might
break the logjam would be a "velvet divorce" of the following form:
[Under this scenario,] the local exchange carriers spin off their operating
companies completely and create a separate entity that will hold all
unregulated or non-local exchange carrier activities. Those non-local
exchange carriers are then able to buy resale and unbundled network
198 Id.
199 Ashworth, supra note 194.
200 Tim Richardson, BT Retail Chief 'Fiercely Opposed' to Sale of Local Loop, THE REG.,
Aug. 29, 2001, http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/archive/21336.htm.
201 Hugo Dixon, Global Finance-Breaking Views, WALL ST. J. EUR., Aug. 8, 2001, at 24
(summarizing industry analysts' average estimate of BT Wholesale's value to be £23 billion).
202 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 551-57; Robert E. Hall, Paul W. MacAvoy &
Robert D. Willig, Panel Discussion, in IS THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 BROKEN? IF SO,
How CAN WE Fix IT? 21 (J. Gregory Sidak ed., 1999) (remarks of J. Gregory Sidak, moderator).
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elements on the same pricing terms as AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and others.
Then, those pieces of the former local exchange carriers immediately
enter the interLATA market. The local exchange operations remain as
some highly regulated activity that cannot ... engage in other lines of
business.
20 3
The operative word in this passage is "immediately." As envisioned by
Sidak in 1997, this form of regulatory divestiture would entail the
immediate lifting of all Section 271 barriers on an RBOC's provision of
interLATA service once the RBOC had structurally separated itself.04 In
practice, of course, voluntary structural separation or divestiture by an
RBOC has not been treated in this manner by regulators or competitors.
The divestiture of AirTouch from Pacific Telesis in April 1994 is
instructive.20 5 After more than a year of state and federal regulatory
reviews, AirTouch became a separately owned and managed company that
was publicly traded and that had no local exchange operations. Still, the
Department of Justice (acting upon MCI's complaint) continued to regard
AirTouch as a "successor" to a Bell operating company, which meant that,
under the Modification of Final Judgment, AirTouch could not offer its
wireless customers its own interLATA service. It took AirTouch a year of
litigation for a federal court to confirm the obvious: A wireless company
203 Id. (emphasis added). The label "velvet divorce" alludes, of course, to the peaceful
bifurcation of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia after the collapse of
communism.
204 Sidak and Spulber elaborated in 1997 on the potential for regulatory divestiture to
break the Section 271 logjam:
If an RBOC could shed itself of ownership of its local exchange network, it would have a
powerful basis for arguing that it should be free immediately to offer in-region interLATA
service, notwithstanding the onerous "checklist" procedure specified in Section 271 of the
Communications Act. For an RBOC, rapid entry into the interLATA market would be a major
accomplishment, for securing the permission to enter that long-distance market was the
principal objective that the RBOCs sought in the 1996 legislation. Following the spinoff
transaction, an RBOC would no longer own bottleneck facilities in the local market. As a mere
reseller of local exchange services, the post-spinoff RBOC would have no ability to exclude
competitors, as regulators have perennially feared. In other words, the RBOC would shed itself
of the distinguishing characteristic that provided the rationale both for the imposition of the
interLATA restriction in the Modification of Final Judgment and for the subsequent checklist
procedure in the 1996 legislation for lifting that restriction. Nonetheless, the RBOC would
retain a valuable brand name with which to market lucrative interLATA services within the
states in which it formerly provided local exchange services. In short, the RBOC's means of
lifting the regulatory quarantine is divestiture.
SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 156, at 556. Another motivation for this strategy of voluntary
divestiture would be for the ILEC to prevent opportunistic behavior by regulators in the pricing
of unbundled network access and in compelling cross subsidies to residential and high-cost
customers. See id. at 553, 556.
205 See MACAVOY, supra note 142, at 196-200.
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that is completely divested from an RBOC is no longer an RBOC for
206regulatory purposes.
e. Enhanced Services
Ignored by Mr. Armstrong and other proponents of mandatory
structural separation is the fact that the FCC previously rejected that form
of regulatory intervention after trying for many years to make it work. The
FCC required that the Bell operating companies ("BOCs") provide
"enhanced services" through separate subsidiaries.207  That regulatory
experiment, however, produced smaller benefits and greater costs than the
FCC had expected, and the agency accordingly scrapped structural
separation in 1986.208 The FCC first reviewed the costs of structural
separation:
Structural separation imposes opportunity costs by discouraging the
BOCs from designing innovative enhanced services that utilize the
resources of the public switched network. Such innovation losses,
resulting from the physical, technical, and organizational constraints
imposed by the structural separation requirements, directly harm the
209public, which does not realize the benefits of new offerings.
206 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 890 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1995).
207 The definition of "enhanced" service was always Delphic: it was anything that was not
"basic" service. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit defined the term this way:
[T]he FCC's terms "basic" and "enhanced" . . . distinguish between regulated common
carrier communications services, which consist largely of plain old telephone service
(POTS), and unregulated data processing services which use the telephone network to
convey information from remote computers to customers' terminals. In the FCC's formal
terms, basic service is the offering of a "pure transmission capability over a
communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer
supplied information." An enhanced service combines basic service with "computer
processing applications [that] ...act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar
aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information, or provide the subscriber additional,
different or restructured information, or involve subscriber interaction with stored
information.
Califomia v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1223 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Final
Decision, Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387, 420 (1980), and citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1989)).
208 In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry), and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services
and Facilities Authorizations Thereof, Communications Protocols under Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report and order). The structural
separation requirement applied to AT&T also, but for the ease of exposition we discuss only the BOCs.
209 Id. T 89, at 1007.
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The FCC further observed that
direct costs on the BOCs from the duplication of facilities and personnel,
the limitations on joint marketing, and the inability to take advantage of
scope economies . . . . are indications of more fundamental costs of
structural separation-namely, that the BOCs are unable to organize their
operations in the manner best suited to the markets and customers they
210serve.
In the FCC's judgment, a lesser, nonstructural remedy could achieve the
intended public-interest benefit at a lesser cost to consumer welfare:
These costs, which are potentially very significant, can be eliminated to a
large extent if structural separation is replaced with nonstructural
safeguards. Even though such safeguards, by their very nature, would
place some restrictions on BOC activities, they would largely avoid
imposing regulatory limitations on the design and implementation of new
services.211
Therefore, the FCC concluded, "compared with well-tailored nonstructural
safeguards, structural separation restricts effective BOC participation in
the markets for [enhanced services] and, accordingly, disserves the
public's interest in obtaining the benefits of more price and service
competition. ,
212
The FCC further concluded in 1986 that, in addition to having greater
costs than nonstructural safeguards, structural separation did not produce
"significantly greater" benefits for consumers than would nonstructural
safeguards.3 The FCC first made this comparison with respect to possible
cross-subsidization.- Next, the Commission considered the argument
210 Id. 91,atIO08.
211 Id. 91,atI008-09.
212 Id. 93, at 1009. The FCC also found that the waiver process was not an acceptable
check on the inefficiencies of structural separation:
We also find the waiver process to be ineffective in addressing the problems we have found
with structural separation .... Despite our best efforts to expedite the waiver process, the
adversarial nature of such proceedings has delayed their resolution, which has necessarily
deferred any societal benefits that the integrated service could offer.
Id. 94, at 1009-10.
213 Id. 96, at 1010.
214 Id. ("The availability of bypass and other new technologies places some limits on the
BOCs' ability to shift costs from their unregulated services to their regulated offerings without
reducing the demand for those offerings. This is evidenced by the increase of competition in
intraLATA toll markets and the development of private networks and shared tenant services. The
persistent political and regulatory pressures to minimize rural, residential, and small business local
Yale Journal on Regulation
currently made by AT&T to justify mandatory structural separation of the
ILEC-discriminatory access to network interconnection:
We also conclude that our nonstructural requirements will perform as
well as structural separation in combating the possibility of
discrimination by the BOCs. We believe that the discrimination potential
inherent in the BOCs' control of the local exchange monopolies has
eroded since the BOC Separation Order. We do not dispute that the
BOCs retain some ability to establish network standards that discriminate
against competing enhanced services. However, several factors check the
BOCs' use of this power. First, when setting network standards the
BOCs must coordinate with one another, other exchange carriers, and
interexchange carriers through standards groups .... While the standards
adopted by these groups are voluntary, significant departures by the
BOCs that affected enhanced service vendors' ability to provide services
would be readily apparent to industry participants and the Commission,
and would be subject to investigation and appropriate remedies. Second,
the growth of bypass and other alternatives to local service, by eroding
the local monopolies, will limit the effects of such discrimination to some
extent. Third, and most importantly, our CEI [comparably efficient
interconnection] and Open Network Architecture requirements are
specifically designed to ensure that all enhanced services providers,
including the BOCs' unregulated operations, receive equal access to the
BOCs' basic facilities, and our information disclosure requirements give
enhanced service providers timely technical and marketing information
in order to utilize those basic facilities.
215
Given this assessment of the costs and benefits of structural separation for
the BOCs' provision of enhanced services, the FCC abandoned its policy
in favor of a less burdensome alternative. The Commission found that "the
costs from the structural separation requirements in lost innovation and
inefficiency render these requirements far less desirable than nonstructural
safeguards., 2 6 The FCC also stressed the importance of preserving
economies of scope with respect to a BOC's marketing of enhanced
services:
Our elimination of structural separation for . . . the BOCs will permit
these carriers to engage in the joint marketing of enhanced and basic
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services. We do not view such joint marketing as an improper,
anticompetitive practice by these carriers and see significant public costs
and few benefits in carving out a limited area of structural separation for
marketing. Marketing plays an important role, and represents a
significant cost, in bringing new services to the public. We see no reason
to handicap ... the BOCs competitively in this regard, particularly when
significant competitors in the markets for enhanced and integrated
systems are not so limited. Again, in our view, the nonstructural
safeguards we establish in this Order adequately address the legitimate
concerns of some competitors that joint marketing not provide a vehicle
for cross-subsidization, discrimination in the provision of basic services,
or improper use of customer proprietary information.
2 17
These same considerations apply with equal, if not greater, force in 2002
to an ILEC's joint marketing of local telecommunications services to end
consumers and unbundled network access to CLECs.
III. The Probable Cause of CLEC Failures
The primary reason for CLEC failures has been the building of
capacity too rapidly ahead of demand. This phenomenon became known as
the Field of Dreams strategy: "If you build it, they will come."
Unfortunately for many CLECs, the customers did not come quickly
enough. A May 11, 2001 account in the Wall Street Journal provided a
sober assessment of the capacity glut:
Hundreds of upstarts rushed to build state-of-the-art networks to carry the
expected surge of demand, and incumbents such as AT&T Corp. and the
Baby Bells also awakened to the opportunity, investing billions in their
own wireless and Internet businesses. Investors rushed to supply the
cash, and Wall Street firms have made $7 billion in fees by raising debt
and equity for the companies since 1995. But the demand didn't
materialize as quickly as expected, and the Baby Bells proved to be tough
competitors for the upstarts. Today, more than 97% of fiber-optic
218capacity goes unused.
In 2000, capital expenditures by the new local carriers increased 39%,
while the revenues generated from the networks added with this capital
217 Id. 99, at 1012.
218 Gregory Zuckerman & Deborah Soloman, Telecom Debt Debacle Could Lead to Losses
of Historic Proportions, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2001, at Al.
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reportedly increased only 11%.29 With so much excess capacity, some
CLECs exit the market because the market price falls below their average
variable cost.
220
During the eighteen months spanning May 2000 through March 2002,
there were at least twenty-four notable CLEC failures. Table 1 lists the
major CLEC failures in reverse chronological order. Other plausible
explanations for CLEC failures were an over-reliance on resale and
reciprocal compensation arbitrage. In the following Sections, we examine
the likely cause of the CLECs' problems.221
A. Faulty Business Strategies
To gauge the initial success of each CLEC, it is more productive to
examine how it has translated investment in fixed assets into revenues. The
successful firms should be enrolling customers and realizing revenues as
they deploy their networks. But CLECs that fail to attract customers as
rapidly as they invest capital are obviously more likely to fail to convince
investors that they should continue to fund negative cash flows.
Among the better CLECs in translating investment in fixed assets into
revenues have been Time Warner, RCN, and Intermedia. Among the least
successful have been Rhythms, Covad, NorthPoint, and Teligent.222 The
latter firms have entered bankruptcy, while the former have survived thus
far without recourse to Chapter 11. Even though the more successful firms
have suffered a substantial decline in market capitalization, they continue
to grow and to invest in facilities. The failing firms simply did not attract
customers and generate revenues at a rate that was commensurate with
their deployment of capital facilities.
219 Tom Fredrickson, Too Many Lines, Too Few Callers; Telecom Upstarts Shelving
Expansion Plans, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Apr. 23, 2001, at 20.
220 For the derivation of the exit rule, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER,
MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 156 (7th ed. 1995).
221 This discussion relies extensively on ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
COMPETITIVE LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS FIVE YEARS AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT (report prepared for SBC Communications, June 2001), available at
http://www.criterioneconomics.com/documents/Crandall%20CLEC.pdf.
222 These conclusions are based on a regression of the logarithm of revenues in a given
quarter on the logarithm of fixed assets in the previous quarter and separate dummy variables for each
CLEC for a sample of thirty-seven publicly traded CLECs. See CRANDALL, supra note 221.
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What accounts for this wide differential in the ability of CLECs to
generate revenues from their capital investments? An empirical analysis of
CLECs that are publicly traded and for which there is information on
network deployment, customer base, and business strategy provides at
least a tentative conclusion. Those CLECs that rely on building their own
networks are able to generate greater revenues per unit of capital
investment than those that rely on the leasing of unbundled network
elements ("UNEs") from ILECs or on the resale of ILEC services. Having
its own facilities allows the entrant to develop services that are attractive to
subscribers.223
Turning to the customer base, there appears to be little difference in
the performance between CLECs that target business customers and those
that primarily serve residential customers. Apparently, the few CLECs that
address the residential market, such as RCN, do not systematically under-
perform the vast majority of CLECs that target the business market, all
other factors being equal. Nor does reliance upon reciprocal compensation
payments, primarily from terminating Internet traffic, contribute
significantly to revenue growth-a surprising result given the limited
effort required to obtain such revenues when terminating calls directed
toward an ISP.224 The FCC's decision in April 2001 to revise and reduce
reciprocal compensation rates has severely limited the success of this
strategy. 25
A few CLECs have used a resale and UNE strategy with limited
success, and Intermedia has been relatively successful with a LNE-only
strategy, but empirical analysis suggests that building one's own network
is likely to be the best way to build revenues. Of course, this does not
guarantee that an entrant will ultimately become profitable and survive.
Only time will provide the proof of long-term profitability.
There is simply no support for the notion that the inability to gain
interconnection through UNEs or the transfer of resale customers has
impeded CLEC growth. Empirical analysis simply leads to the conclusion
that building one's own network is likely the best platform strategy for
long-term revenue growth. A mixed strategy of using LNEs or resale with
one's own network appears to work tolerably well, but simply relying on
the ILEC's network appears to be a strategy that limits a CLEC's growth.
223 See id. These conclusions are based on a regression analysis of the logarithm of revenues
on lagged fixed capital and dummy variables reflecting network strategy (own facilities, UNEs, resale,
or a combination of these choices), dummy variables for concentration on business or residential
subscribers, and a dummy variable for reliance on reciprocal compensation.
224 See infra text accompanying note 227.
225 In re Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610 (2001)
(notice of proposed rulemaking).
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Just changing the nameplate on the service is not typically a very good
strategy for attracting customers. The empirical evidence supports Justice
Breyer's assessment in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board: "A totally
unbundled world-a world in which competitors share every part of an
incumbent's existing system, including, say, billing, advertising, sales
staff, and work force (and in which regulators set all unbundling




As shown in Table 1, a large number of CLECs have filed for
bankruptcy protection due to their inability to generate revenues and cash
flows that are sufficient to justify their aggressive investment strategies.
The most common problems that have plagued these unsuccessful CLECs
have been over-expansion (leading to poor quality), reliance on resale, and
reliance on reciprocal compensation arbitrage. The last of these problems
deserves some elaboration.
Reciprocal compensation connotes the charges that the ILEC pays the
CLEC to terminate calls that the ILEC's customers make to subscribers on
the CLEC's (typically much smaller) access network. (The CLEC
reciprocally owes the same payments to the ILEC when the CLEC
originates traffic that terminates on the ILEC's network.) By focusing on
customers that would not make outgoing calls to other carriers' networks,
but rather would only receive traffic from other carriers, the "recip-comp"
CLECs were eligible to receive large amounts of compensation to
terminate traffic on their networks at a cost far less than the regulated
termination charge. This strategy was, in essence, an arbitrage play, made
possible by (1) the reciprocal application to the CLECs of the ILEC's
regulated rates for providing higher-cost terminating access and (2) the
inherently asymmetric traffic patterns of dial-up Internet Service Providers
("ISPs"), which generate few if any outgoing calls.227
226 525 U.S. 366, 430 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227 See generally Global Naps, Inc. v. FCC, 247 F.3d 252 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Worldcom, Inc.
v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690 (D.C. Cir. 2001); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Cyberjam: The Law
and Economics of Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 327
(1998).
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1. ICG Communications, Inc.
ICG Communications, Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
September 2000.228 When asked to comment on ICG's recent performance,
Andrew Morley of Level 3 Communications stated, "[Y]ou need to know
who your customers are, know why you serve them and remember they are
your No. 1 priority. That's where I think ICG took its eye off the ball.
229
An equity analyst said that "the company put in all [those] lines and a lot
of them must not have been working right" such that "major customers
[are] saying they may pull their business.,,230 Thus, industry sources
believe that over-expansion was a major problem in the case of ICG,
leading to poor product quality, and, eventually, lost business.
These views of ICG's problems are supported by data on its revenue
and access-line growth from 1998 to the third quarter of 2000. During this
time period, ICG's average revenue growth was approximately 9.1% per
quarter, while average line access lines growth was approximately 19%
per quarter. ICG was extracting less money for each access line in its
network over this time period.23 The more successful CLECs suffered
much smaller declines in revenues per line, and one-Allegiance-
actually experienced an increase in revenues per line over this period.
2. CTC Communications
Another CLEC that relies heavily on resale is CTC Communications.
CTC provides local and long-distance telephone, and high-speed data
services, 232 and it leases 97% of its network lines through resale
agreements. CTC has been very aggressive in adding capital assets. In the
first quarter of 1998, CTC reported only $1.7 million in capital assets, but
it expanded steadily to over $195 million in assets by the fourth quarter of
2000. During the period, revenues rose steadily from $12.8 million to
$62.3 million. Thus, capital assets were growing at about 43% per quarter,
while revenues were growing at about 14% per quarter. Given the
difference in the growth rate of assets over revenues, CTC has since
revised its business model, adding new lines only after it has signed on
228 Jeff Smith, ICG Communications Files for Bankruptcy, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Nov. 15, 2000, at lB.
229 Id.
230 Heather Draper, ICG's Tumble a Wake-up Call to Telecom Firms, DENV. ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sep. 24, 2000, at IG (quoting Dave Heger of A.G. Edwards).
231 Revenue figures are obtained from various SEC Form 10-Qs.
232 CTC COMMUNICATIONS CORP., 1999 SEC FORM 10-K, at 1 (June 29, 2000).
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new customers.233 The revised plan was announced at a time when CTC's
stock price had fallen from a high of over $50 to around $5.
Over-expansion is clearly a major source of CTC's problems and this
is obviously one reason for its new deployment strategy, but another
problem is its reliance on resale. A simple resale strategy has caused
serious problems for many CLECs, most notably AT&T. If AT&T found
resale unprofitable, then there is no reason to think that a smaller firm,
such as CTC, would be able to build a sustainable business by reselling
ILEC services.
3. Teligent
On May 21, 2001, Teligent filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection. Trading of the firm's stock was halted on NASDAQ at fifty-six
cents per share. Fourteen months before the bankruptcy filing, Teligent's
stock was trading at nearly $100 per share and the firm was seen as
potentially one of the most powerful CLECs in the industry.234
The reason for Teligent's failure was over-expansion, but of a type
different from most other CLECs. Teligent's business model was to
provide voice and data services over a fixed-wireless system. This strategy
avoids the last-mile access problem, but it can be very costly.
235
Teligent ran into problems when it tried to build networks in large
numbers of new markets all at once and relied too heavily on debt
financing for the necessary capital expenditures. Many of Teligent's new
markets might have eventually been very profitable because it would have
offered a service far different from that of the ILECs, but its poor debt
management resulted in a financial squeeze and subsequent bankruptcy.
The lessons to be taken from Teligent's failure are that building local
networks takes time and that markets must be added at reasonable rates so
that profits from existing markets can ease the cost of adding new markets
and thereby avoid a drain of capital reserves.
4. NorthPoint Communications
Before declaring bankruptcy and then selling its network assets to
AT&T in March 2001, NorthPoint Communications was one of the largest
233 Tom Fredrickson, Too Many Lines, Too Few Callers; Telecom Upstarts Shelving
Expansion Plans, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Apr. 23, 2001, at 20.
234 Yuki Noguchi, Teligent Files for Chapter 11 Protection; Move Adds to Doubt On
Broadband's Role, WASH. POST, May 22, 2001, at El.
235 Id.
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digital subscriber line ("DSL") providers in the nation, with approximately
100,000 customers. NorthPoint's business model was to be a wholesale
supplier of DSL, using ILEC UNEs and selling the service to ISPs, which
in turn enrolled the end users. 236 This business model may have made
sense to the extent that NorthPoint could have captured a better margin by
being the initial producer of the service while avoiding the costs of
retailing. Unfortunately, the bursting of the Internet bubble in the stock
market created financial problems for many of NorthPoint's clients, such
as Telocity. As a result, NorthPoint had to revise downward its third
quarter reported revenue from $30 million to $24 million because about
30% of NorthPoint's clients where delinquent in paying their bills.
237
After the revised earnings statement, Verizon (one of the four largest
ILECs in the United States) promptly cancelled a deal to purchase
NorthPoint due the company's financial disarray.238 By the time that the
Verizon deal had fallen through, the capital markets had sharply reduced
the flow of funds to the failing Internet firms. NorthPoint was
consequently left with a partially completed network and a huge shortfall
of capital funding because it had not pursued additional financing,
counting instead on the Verizon deal to be completed.2 39 NorthPoint was
forced to file for bankruptcy protection, and, eventually, to sell its network
elements to AT&T.
Interestingly enough, in the AT&T deal with NorthPoint, AT&T
required NorthPoint to suspend operations, ensuring that it would not have
to honor contracts with NorthPoint's ISP clients. AT&T stated that it
preferred to offer the entire service itself, rather than acting as a wholesale
agent for DSL service.24 °
5. Focal Communications
In 1997, Focal Communications derived over 80% of its total
revenues from reciprocal compensation. With uncertainty looming over a
possible FCC decision to reduce reciprocal compensation, Focal was
forced to reduce its dependence on reciprocal compensation to 30% of
revenues in the year 2000 and hoped to reduce this figure to 15% of
revenues in 2001. These efforts were not sufficient to keep its stock price
236 Elizabeth Douglas, 100,000 Subscribers of NorthPoint DSL Face Disconnection, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at C3.
237 Peter S. Goodman, Verizon Terminates Deal to Buy Stake in NorthPoint, WASH. POST,
Nov. 30, 2000, at E9.
238 Id.
239 Douglas, supra note 236, at C3.
240 Id.
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from declining by 80% in the first half of 2000 as the financial markets
reflected a continuing concern over cash flow problems stemming from
reliance on reciprocal compensation. 241 Focal's stock made a 35:1 reverse
stock split on March 11, 2002, and its adjusted value has fallen by over
99.8% in the two years since its high of $77.75 in March 2000.242
Other companies have recognized the folly of building a business
strategy on the arbitrage opportunities presented by reciprocal
compensation. For example, Intermedia Communications was forced to
reduce its expectations of revenue in 2000 as a result of expected
reductions in reciprocal compensation fees.243 The expected change in fees
came as a result of state court rulings recommending the reduction of
reciprocal compensation rates. This reduction in expected revenues from
reciprocal compensation was cited as one reason why Broadwing
abandoned its negotiations to buy Intermedia. As a result, the value of
Intermedia's shares fell 14% in one day.244
An even bigger problem from relying on reciprocal compensation is
the indirect loss of revenues from poor network design in executing that
strategy. Because Focal initially designed its network around extracting
reciprocal compensation revenues, 100% of its access lines were UNE
lines. Focal's CLEC competitors were adding their own components and
building their own lines while Focal continued to lease UNEs from the
ILECs. This was a poor business strategy because it limited Focal's ability
to offer product quality that differs from that provided by the ILECs. In the
long term, customers are more likely to prefer a CLEC to an ILEC if the
CLEC can offer better service, lower cost, or a combination of the two.
Focal is unable to offer service or cost improvements over the ILECs
because Focal's entire network is based on UNEs.
C. The Effect on Local Competition of Elimination of Unbundling
Requirements
To meet the goal of the Telecommunications Act of 1996-the
development of facilities-based competition in local telephony--CLECs
must invest in their own facilities. But every CLEC will forgo facilities-
based investments so long as it has other opportunities that have higher net
present values ("NPV"). Artificially low UNE prices induce CLECs
241 Sandra Jones, A Disconnect for Phone Upstart; Focal Sees Threat to Key Sales Engine,
CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Jan. 8, 2001, at 1.
242 Focal Communications, at http://www.focal.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2002).
243 INTERMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS INC., 1999 SEC FORM 10-Q, at 14 (Nov. 14, 2000).
244 Kris Hundley, Intermedia Revenues Come Up Short, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 12,
2000, at El.
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continually to defer facilities-based investments because the NPV
calculations of UNE leasing are often higher than the NPV calculations of
sinking capital into on-net assets. Because the NPV calculus is driven by
presently unknown factors-such as the future expected cash flow of the
asset-choosing to make an investment today is inherently risky.
Moreover, making an investment in telecommunications assets is
particularly risky given the industry's technological dynamism and
uncertain market demand. The decision to invest commits the CLEC to a
particular technology that may reveal itself later to be inferior, and the
telecommunications industry has historically been driven by rapidly
leapfrogging technologies. 45 Indeed, new empirical evidence suggests that
underpriced UNEs deter CLEC facilities-based investment. James Eisner
and Dale Lehman find in a regression analysis of CLEC investment levels
across the United States that there is a significant positive relationship
between CLEC facilities-based investment and the LINE rates.246
D. Assessment of the CLEC Sector
We have reviewed the evidence that CLECs that deliberately built out
their own networks, having carefully analyzed competition and consumer
demand before entry, were able to increase revenues and continue to
attract capital. Several of the more successful CLECs combined resale and
the leasing of unbundled network elements with the construction of their
own networks, but none of these firms relies exclusively on UNEs or
resale and these firms added more facilities-based elements over time to
improve upon the product that the ILECs offer. The fact that some firms,
such as Allegiance, were able to employ a resale and/or LINE strategy as
part of their business plan provides strong refutation that the ILECs were
responsible for the recent spate of CLEC failures.
Since December 1999, the CLEC share of the nation's access lines
has expanded rapidly. By June 2001, the CLECs had 9.0% of the country's
245 The FCC has noted the unpredictability of technological changes in the communications
industry as well. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 16 F.C.C.R. 9151 51 (2001) (order on
remand and report and order) ("Although we cannot anticipate the direction that new technology will
take us, we do expect the dramatic pace of change to continue. Congress clearly did not expect the
dynamic, digital broadband driven telecommunications marketplace to be hindered by rules premised
on legacy networks and technological assumptions that are no longer valid. Section 251(i), together
with Section 201, equips the Commission with the tools to ensure that the regulatory environment
keeps pace with innovation.").
246 JAMES EISNER & DALE E. LEHMAN, REGULATORY BEHAVIOR AND COMPETITIVE ENTRY
1, (June 28, 2001) (presented at the 14th Annual Western Conference Center for Research in Regulated
Industries) ("We find states with low UNE prices have less facilities-based entry, with more
ambiguous effects on the other two forms of entry.").
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switched-access lines and were continuing to grow.2 47 Unfortunately,
many of the entrants were not able to survive the large decline in the
market for high-technology equity shares that began in March 2000. These
companies generally had faulty business plans that were exposed when a
declining stock market severely reduced their ability to raise capital. The
ensuing shakeout of entrants has been described as "only natural" by the
chairman and CEO of Allegiance, who pointed out that the exuberant
capital markets of 1999 and early 2000 created an environment in which
"no business plan [was] too weak or management team too inexperienced
to get funded. 248
Virtually every exercise in deregulation or market liberalization leads
to a wave of entry followed by a wave of bankruptcies. This was the
experience in trucking and airline deregulation-two industries in which
technology has been rather stagnant. Given the rapid changes in
technology in telecommunications and the fact that there are few historical
models of competition in local telephone service, the likelihood of failed
entry is surely much greater in this market. Nevertheless, the good news is
that some entrants are succeeding and growing and that local markets are
steadily becoming more competitive.
IV. The Ulterior Motivation for Advocating Mandatory Structural
Separation: Raising Rivals' Costs
We have argued that mandatory structural separation would not
produce any benefit to consumer welfare, or any other public interest
benefit that we can identify. On the contrary, such regulatory intervention
would be a costly non-solution to a non-problem. That conclusion, of
course, does not say anything about whether mandatory structural
separation would produce private economic benefits to CLECs. That the
chairman of AT&T would so vigorously advocate this new form of
regulatory intervention in 2001 suggests that his company would derive
considerable strategic advantage from it. In the following sections, we
therefore speculate on the nature of the strategic benefit that AT&T and
other CLECs could expect to derive from mandatory structural separation,
irrespective of its harm to consumers and the public interest. Such an
analysis can clarify for legislators, regulators, and courts the political
economy of this proposed intervention.
247 See LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION UPDATE, supra note 2.
248 CLEC Representatives Have Doubts About FCC's 'Recip Comp' Order, TR DAILY, May
15, 2001 (quoting Royce Holland).
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From the perspective of a major CLEC like AT&T, mandatory
structural separation effectuates a strategy of "raising rivals' costs '249 by
increasing the incumbent burdens borne by the ILEC. An incumbent bur-
den arises when "incumbents face costs owing to regulation that are not
imposed on entrants., 250 As one of us has previously written with
Professor Daniel F. Spulber, "incumbent burdens are analogous to the
phenomenon of 'raising rivals' costs,' except that in an industry subject to
public utility regulation the 'rival' whose cost is being raised is the incum-
bent public utility rather than the entrant., 251 In a regulated network
industry, "the raising of a rival's cost is a method not of facilitating
inefficient exclusion from a market, but of facilitating inefficient entry into
it.'' 252 Mandatory structural separation of the ILECs would be a newly
imposed incumbent burden because, by regulatory fiat, it would compel
the incumbent-and only the incumbent-to operate through structurally
separate wholesale and retail operations.
If antitrust is predicated on consumer welfare maximization and if
telecommunications regulation should share that same orientation, then
why does raising a rival's cost matter? Concern over such conduct would
seem, at first blush, to focus on competitor welfare rather than consumer
welfare. The answer is that the higher costs of rivals are passed along
ultimately in higher prices to consumers and reduced levels of output.
Moreover, by reducing the productive efficiency of rivals, this strategic
behavior erodes profitability and, hence, reduces returns to investors, thus
discouraging investment. It also reduces the ability of the rival firm to fund
its own investment through retained earnings, because the pool of earnings
diminishes by the amount of the inefficiency by which the rival has been
handicapped. Consumer welfare, and economic welfare generally,
therefore fall as the result of a strategy of raising rivals' costs.
This strategic and anticompetitive implication of mandatory structural
separation is sophisticated and subtle because it exploits two other
preexisting regulatory policies that concern pricing and cost recovery by
the ILECs. First, mandatory structural separation has important
implications for the prevailing test that regulators use to define a retail
price squeeze, a test that can have the effect of facilitating (inefficient)
entry by raising the ILEC's retail price. Because mandatory structural
249 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
250 SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 156, at 30. The concept of incumbent burdens originated
in Paul W. MacAvoy, Daniel F. Spulber & Bruce E. Stangle, Is Competitive Entry Free? Bypass and
Partial Deregulation in Natural Gas Markets, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 210 (1989).
251 SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 156, at 30-31 (footnote omitted).
252 Id. at 31.
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separation raises the ILEC's costs, it evidently would justify a state PUC's
ordering a higher retail price floor for the ILEC's retail service. Although
plainly harmful to consumer welfare, that strategy of raising rivals' costs
facilitates AT&T's entry into the local market. Second, this strategy
becomes even more surreptitious because of the way that state and federal
regulators allow, through the process of "jurisdictional separations," an
ILEC to recover through its regulated rates the non-traffic-sensitive costs
of its network that are incurred in common across both intrastate and
interstate services. Because of the reluctance of state regulators to raise the
ILEC's allowed price for an unbundled loop and the reluctance of the FCC
to raise the ILEC's allowed price for interstate access (which is already
subject to a price-cap that declines over time), the additional costs imposed
on an ILEC by virtue of mandatory structural separation might, for
political rather than economic reasons, be unrecoverable in both the state
and federal jurisdictions.
A. Mandatory Structural Separation and the Retail Price-Squeeze Rule
After the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, AT&T
argued that resale of the ILEC's local service was an essential precursor to,
not a substitute for, facilities-based entry under the new legislative
scheme. 5 3 Section 252(d)(3) of the Communications Act, added in 1996,
provides that the discount to which the CLEC is entitled when purchasing
the ILEC's wholesale service is based on decremental cost-the cost that
the ILEC actually avoids when no longer retailing local exchange service
254to an end consumer. As indicated by Mr. Armstrong's remarks
discussed earlier in Part 1,255 AT&T regarded the avoided-cost discounts
set by regulators as too low to make resale a feasible strategy-which is
simply to say that AT&T evidently concluded after 1996 that its own
incremental cost of retailing an ILEC's wholesale local service exceeded
the ILEC's decremental cost of not retailing that same service. There is, of
course, nothing anticompetitive about one set of firms having inherently
lower costs than another set of firms when performing a particular
productive activity; certainly, such asymmetry of costs should surprise no
253 See John D. Zeglis, Out of the Courts and into the Market: Wouldn't It Be Great?, in Is
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 BROKEN? IF SO, How CAN WE Fix IT? 100, 100-01 (J.
Gregory Sidak ed., 1999) ("Total service resale offered a chance for easy market entry, followed by
more meaningful forms of competition.") (edited text of speech by president of AT&T delivered Dec.
18, 1997); see also KAHN, LETTING Go, supra note 90, at 47-53, 90-96; Sidak & Spulber, The Tragedy
of the Telecommons, supra note 90.
254 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(3) (2000). For the statutory text, see supra note 169.
255 See supra text accompanying note 60.
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one in an industry in which the government has heavily regulated one set
of firms and thus inevitably skewed its choice of production technology.
Rather than pursue a local competition strategy predicated on resale
(or on widespread leasing of unbundled loops at regulated prices), AT&T
pursued a costly facilities-based strategy of entry into the local
telecommunications market, as noted in Part 11.256 AT&T spent more than
$100 billion between 1996 and 2001 to buy TCI and MediaOne, two of the
nation's largest cable MSOs. AT&T thereby gambled that, through
substantial subsequent investment, the company could upgrade and
combine the (generally one-way) cable systems of the various MSOs to
create a viable two-way network for local telecommunications. For
AT&T's facilities-based strategy to succeed, the company must be able to
offer consumers a lower (quality-adjusted) retail price for local
telecommunications services than the ILEC's retail price, or new service,
or both. By December 2001, however, the New York Times concluded that
"[t]he rough financial calculations suggest that the cable strategy was a
wash or a modest loser for the company's shareholders ....
State PUCs faced a similar issue even before their implementation of
the local interconnection provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996. When entrants have sought to compete in local telecommunications
markets (such as intraLATA toll service) by purchasing the use of the
ILEC's bottleneck elements, state PUCs have regulated not only the
ILEC's maximum price of the bottleneck elements sold to CLECs, but also
the ILEC's minimum price of the retail service sold to consumers in
competition with the CLEC's retail service. The purpose of the two levels
of price regulation is to prevent a price squeeze on the CLEC's sale of the
retail service. If this retail profit margin is too small, a retail price squeeze
is said to have occurred. The California Public Utilities Commission
("CPUC"), one of the earliest state PUCs to adopt a precise price-squeeze
test after hearing extensive economic testimony, announced its rule in
1993 in Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange
Carriers.258 Using the concept of long-run incremental cost ("LRIC"), the
256 In fact, AT&T's decision to acquire cable MSOs represented a reversal of its strategy for
entry into local telecommunications. As late as December 1997, the president of AT&T publicly said,
"Although unbundled network elements are the only practical route for broadly delivering benefits of
competition to residential and most business customers within the next few years, over time AT&T and
other long-distance carries will undoubtedly build some local network facilities of their own." Zeglis,
supra note 253, at 102. AT&T ultimately declined to build its own local network facilities or to lease
unbundled loops on a large scale.
257 Seth Schiesel, The AT&T Chief's Report Card; Did Armstrong Do as Well as Could Be
Expected?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2001, at C1, C2.
258 In re Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, and Related
Matters (Part 2 of 4), Decision No. 93-09-076, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Sept. 17, 1993, 1993 Cal.
PUC LEXIS 649.
Vol. 19:335, 2002
Structural Separation of ILECs
CPUC said, "A price squeeze may be avoided by requiring that the price
floor for the LECs' toll and other competitive services offered under tariff
or by contract should not be lower than the sum of the tariffed rates for the
bottleneck building blocks and the cost (LRIC) of non-bottleneck
components. 25 9 In the case of resale of the ILEC's local service, the LRIC
of non-bottleneck components is simply the ILEC's long-run avoided
(decremental) cost of retailing.
Price-squeeze regulation, however, can be imprecise and can deter
more than simply anticompetitive behavior by the ILEC. The price-
squeeze rule is subject not only to regulatory error, but also to strategic
manipulation by competitors. The CLEC's regulatory strategy, obviously,
is to importune the state PUC to set for the ILEC the lowest possible price
ceiling on UNEs and the highest possible price floor on retail services. In
other words, the CLEC's strategic objective is to secure from the regulator
a price-squeeze rule that maximizes the likelihood of "false positives"-
that is, the rule finds an ILEC's slim profit margin on retail services to be
anticompetitive when it is not. This strategy also would urge the state PUC
to impute the highest possible cost to the ILEC's supply of the non-
bottleneck inputs. The result is a profit margin for CLECs that is
guaranteed by regulation-and quite possibly guaranteed to exceed the
competitive profit margin, given the ILEC's probably greater efficiency in
supplying the non-bottleneck retailing functions required to sell local
telecommunications service to end consumers. It is, of course, exceedingly
259 Id. * 162 (Finding of Fact No. 228). The two largest ILECs in California were then Pacific
Bell and GTEC. The firms seeking to provide competitive services (such as local toll service) were,
among others, AT&T and MCI. To "prevent any price squeeze" by Pacific Bell or GTEC, the CPUC
reaffirmed an earlier order requiring that "the price floor for the LECs' toll and other competitive
services shall not be lower than 'the sum of the tariffed rates for the bottleneck building blocks and the
cost (LRIC) of non-bottleneck components."' Id. at *42 (quoting In re Alternative Regulatory
Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, etc., (Part 2 of 2), Decision No. 89-10-031, Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, Oct. 12, 1989, 1989 Cal. PUC LEXIS 576, at *123 (Conclusion of Law No. 7)).
The CPUC's approach to defining and prohibiting price squeezes is representative of the
approach used by other state PUCs. See, e.g., In the Matter, on the Commission's Own Motion, to
Determine the Total Service Long Run Incremental Costs and Imputation Requirements Under the
Michigan Telecommunications Act, Case No. U-I 1103, Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Dec. 12, 1996,
1996 Mich. PSC LEXIS 294, at *41 ("In giving effect to this policy [of preventing price squeezes],
Subsection 362(2) [of the Michigan Telecommunications Act] expressly states that the rate for a
telecommunication service must exceed the sum of the tariffed rates for access and other
noncompetitive components used to provide the service and the TSLRIC [total service LRIC] of all
other components that are not offered as tariffed services."); In re the Application of Electric
Lightwave, Inc. for a Certificate of Authority to Provide Telecommunications Services in Oregon, (CP
1), etc., Order No. 96-021, Or. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Jan. 12, 1996, 1996 Ore. PUC LEXIS 7,
("[Oregon Revised Statute §] 759.050(5)(b) is designed to prevent price squeezes by establishing an
imputation price floor for services sold by telecommunications utilities within competitive zones. It
requires that the price for a service offered by a telecommunications utility may not be less than the
TSLRIC of nonessential functions plus the price of the essential functions necessary to provide the
service.").
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doubtful that consumers could benefit even in the long run from such
infant-industry regulation.
How does this potential for strategic abuse of price-squeeze
regulation relate to AT&T's advocacy of mandatory structural separation
of ILECs? As noted above, AT&T has complained since the late-1990s
that the wholesale discounts that result from the avoided-cost formula
specified by Congress in Section 252(d)(3) of the Communications Act are
insufficient to allow AT&T's profitable entry into local exchange service.
Thus, AT&T has chosen to enter the local access market instead through
its costly acquisition of TCI and MediaOne. This strategy is noteworthy
because resale and the leasing of unbundled network elements do not even
appear to be the preferred mode of CLEC entry. The practical benefit to
AT&T of mandatory structural separation is to increase the ILEC's
incremental cost of retailing as a non-bottleneck component within the
traditional price-squeeze formula. (The next step in that process, if
permitted on antitrust grounds, will be AT&T's acquisition by Comcast,
another cable MSO.260) In numerous markets, AT&T is no longer
interested in purchasing that non-bottleneck component from the ILEC, as
the company has committed itself instead to facilities-based entry through
the upgrading of cable television systems. Nonetheless, AT&T benefits if,
under the traditional price-squeeze test, the regulator increases the ILEC's
price floor by the amount that mandatory structural separation increases
the ILEC's cost of supplying bottleneck inputs and non-bottleneck inputs
to its own retailing arm and to the CLECs. (It is not necessary to assume,
unrealistically, that the PUC would follow mandatory structural separation
with a large increase in rates for local telephone service.)
An additional complexity arises here. If there are economies of scope
across the ILEC's wholesale and retail operations, then mandatory
structural separation will create increased costs for the ILEC that are
jointly attributable to wholesaling and retailing, but not directly
attributable to either function on its own. Thus, any allocation of common
costs between the two functions will be inherently arbitrary on economic
grounds. On political grounds, however, it may be much harder for
regulators to justify attributing a share of the increased common costs to
the LRIC of the bottleneck elements, such as unbundled loops, for such an
allocation of common costs would tend to discourage non-facilities-based
entry into local telecommunications through the leasing of UNEs. (In
comparison, in 1996, the FCC expressly refused to use Ramsey-pricing
reasoning to allocate to unbundled loops any appreciable share of the
260 Steve Lohr, AT&T's Cable Deal: News Analysis; Clash of the Convergers, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2001, at C1.
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ILEC's forward-looking common costs, on the rationale that loops were
the least substitutable of all of the ILEC's unbundled network elements. 261)
Therefore, state PUCs will have an incentive to attribute all or most of the
increased common costs of mandatory structural separation to the ILEC's
retailing functions, while keeping the regulated prices of UNEs at their
current levels. The state PUCs also will have a pronounced political
incentive to characterize the increased common costs as properly
recoverable through FCC-regulated rates for interstate services rather than
through PUC-regulated rates for intrastate service-an important
institutional consideration to which we now turn.
B. Strategic Exploitation of Jurisdictional Separation of Common Costs
The ILECs face overlapping regulatory jurisdictions. An ILEC
provides intrastate services that are regulated by the state PUC and
interstate services that are regulated by the FCC. For example, the FCC
regulates the ILEC's price of supplying originating or terminating access
for a long-distance call crossing LATA boundaries (usually including state
lines), whereas the state PUC regulates the ILEC's price of the same
access for intrastate toll calls that do not cross LATA boundaries. The
setting of interstate and intrastate prices for access requires that state and
federal regulators allocate to each jurisdiction the ILEC's costs of
supplying access. The ILEC, however, incurs some costs in common when
supplying both the intrastate and interstate services. For example, the cost
of installing and maintaining the copper loop leading from the central
office switch to the customer's premise is a cost that is common to access
services subject to both jurisdictions.
Mandatory structural separation has implications for the ILEC's
jurisdictionally common network costs. We explained in Part II that
mandatory structural separation would likely raise an ILEC's costs. If, as
seems inescapable, any of those cost increases were incurred in common
across jurisdictionally separate services, a state PUC's order of mandatory
structural separation necessarily would increase the costs to an interstate
service that is subject to the FCC's jurisdiction. That increase in the
amount of the ILEC's costs of providing interstate service would, all other
261 Local Competition First Report and Order, supra note 96, 696, at 15,853 ("We conclude
that such an allocation could unreasonably limit the extent of entry into local exchange markets by
allocating more costs to, and thus raising the prices of, the most critical bottleneck inputs, the demand for
which tends to be relatively inelastic. Such an allocation of these costs would undermine the pro-
competitive objectives of the 1996 Act."). Commenting on this reasoning by the FCC, one of us has
written with Professor Daniel Spulber that "[iut is a sham for the FCC to have told incumbent LECs that
they can recover their forward-looking common costs only by raising the prices of their most price-
sensitive network elements above TELRIC." SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 341.
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things being equal, place pressure on the FCC to allow a higher rate for the
regulated interstate service. For political reasons, however, the FCC might
262resist allowing such a rate increase. Consequently, a state's decision to
order mandatory structural separation would surely affect the interstate
jurisdiction and thus implicate the FCC's rate-setting prerogatives.
The FCC and the states address the jurisdictional division of common
costs through the "separations" process, codified in Part 36 of the FCC's
rules.263 That process was a decision jointly made by the states and the
federal government to advance shared political goals concerning the
structure of rates. It was a modification in each state of the regulatory
relationship (which one of us has previously described in contractual
terms264) to which that state was, historically, already a party. The practical
effect of the jurisdictional separation of the ILEC's common costs was to
interpose the federal government (represented by the FCC) as an additional
party to the preexisting regulatory relationship (or contract) between the
state and the ILEC. The allocation by state and federal regulators of a
substantial share of the ILEC's common costs to the interstate side of its
books necessarily carried with it several implied, if not explicit, representa-
tions: The FCC would afford the ILEC the reasonable opportunity to
recover, through its sale of interstate services at regulated rates, the entire
portion of common costs that had arbitrarily been designated as "interstate"
in character; the states would correspondingly allow the ILEC the
reasonable opportunity to recover, through its sale of intrastate services at
regulated rates, the entire portion of common costs that had arbitrarily been
designated as "intrastate" in character; and the states and the FCC jointly
would ensure that the separations process would enable the ILEC to recover
the full amount of common costs. In short, the sum of the parts may not be
less than the whole.
The experience of implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996
raised considerable doubt as to whether the state PUCs and the FCC were
credibly committed to granting the ILECs the reasonable opportunity to
recover their full common costs of local interconnection. Under Chairman
Reed Hundt, the FCC rebuffed, in the First Report and Order on
interconnection, 26  arguments by the ILECs that the FCC's pricingproposals would deny an ILEC the reasonable opportunity to recover its
262 For a discussion of the political resistance of regulators to increase rates to cover costs, see
CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 165, at 166.
263 47 C.F.R. pt. 36. The separations process today removes the ILEC's costs of unregulated
services through Part 64, 47 C.F.R. pt. 64. Interconnection costs and prices are regulated and thus are
subject to the Part 36 process of separating the ILEC's regulated costs.
264 See SIDAK& SPULBER, supra note 7, at 101-77.
265 Local Competition First Report and Order, supra note 96, 696-98, at 15,853-54.
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total costs of providing unbundled network elements and resale. Again, in
its Access Reform Order in May 1997, the FCC reaffirmed its desire for
the ILECs to price unbundled access to their networks at TELRIC and
stated that the agency would address cost recovery issues in a subsequent
order, which never appeared during the remainder of Chairman Hundt's
tenure or during his successor's. 266 In August 1997, Chairman Hundt said,
"The existing competition efforts in local markets are tiny fish that will not
survive in the presence of the incumbent, formerly government-protected,
monopolistic, whale-sized local telephone operating companies, not unless
state and national governments write and enforce procompetitive rules. 2 67
In short, the FCC's action and inaction over nearly a five-year period from
August 1996 to early 2001 suggested that the agency consciously sought to
stimulate competitive entry into local telephony by encouraging (or
commanding, if the courts would permit) the state PUCs to set UNE prices
and resale discounts that would not fully compensate the ILECs for their
forward-looking common costs of local interconnection. 68 Scholars
criticized the FCC for engaging in a sophisticated, opportunistic strategy
of managed competition.269 Chairman Hundt's subsequent memoirs do
more to substantiate the basis for that criticism than refute it.
270
The jurisdictional separations process enables regulators-at the
behest of tiny fish as well as large ones like AT&T and WorldCom-to
266 In re Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers;
Transport Rate Structure and Pricing, End User Common Line Charges, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982 14 (1997)
(First Report and Order).
267 Reed E. Hundt, The Light at the End of the Tunnel v. the Fog: Deregulation v. the Legal
Culture, in IS THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 BROKEN? IF So, How CAN WE Fix IT? 1, 6 (J.
Gregory Sidak ed., 1999) (edited text of speech delivered Aug. 14, 1997).
268 In addition, the FCC appeared to (1) delay the imposition of any alternative mechanism
for cost recovery that might engender political controversy and publicly expose the magnitude of the
shortfall in cost recovery owing to the pricing rule urged upon the states by the FCC, and (2) maintain
that, in the meantime, any claim by an ILEC that the FCC had committed a taking of property was
unripe for adjudication, either because cost recovery issues would still (someday) be addressed by the
FCC or because no confiscation of an ILEC's property could occur until the ILEC had lost appreciable
market share (if not simply profit) to the CLECs.
269 See KAHN, LETTING Go, supra note 253; SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 156, at 307-92,
403-26; see also ALFRED E. KAHN, WHOM THE GODS WOULD DESTROY, OR How NOT TO DEREGULATE
(2001); DALE E. LEHMAN & DENNIS WEISMAN, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: THE
"COSTS" OF MANAGED COMPETITION (2000) (discussing regulatory opportunism in the pricing of UNEs
by state PUCs having price-cap regulation for their ILECs); Hausman, supra note 90.
270 REED E. HUNDT, YOU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION: A STUDY OF INFORMATION AGE
POLITICS 154 (2000) ("The conference committee compromises [for the Telecommunications Act of
1996] had produced a mountain of ambiguity that was generally tilted toward the local phone companies'
advantage. But under principles of statutory construction, we had broad discretion in writing the
implementing regulations. Indeed like the modem engineers trying to straighten the Leaning Tower of
Pisa, we could aspire to provide the new entrants to the local telephone markets a fairer chance to compete
than they might find in any explicit provision of the law."); see also Glen 0. Robinson, Reed Hundt.
Revolutionary Manqug, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 197 (2001) (critical review of HUNDT, supra).
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make even more opaque this strategy of managed competition as it
concerns the recovery of an ILEC's common costs of interconnection. The
FCC has said of the separations process: "While a competitive LEC is free
to recover costs according to market demand, an ILEC subject to our
jurisdictional separations rules may only attempt to recover costs classified
as interstate through charges for interstate services, and costs classified as
intrastate through charges for intrastate services. '271 That statement is
incomplete because it ignores the third condition implicit in the
jurisdictional separation of an ILEC's common costs: That allowed
charges for interstate services and for intrastate services together shall
allow the ILEC the reasonable opportunity, in light of observed conditions
of market demand, to recover all of the ILEC's common costs. The
obligation of state and federal regulators to permit the ILEC to charge rates
(and earn revenues, given demand conditions) that fully recover common
costs cannot be discharged simply by dividing those common costs into
two categories labeled "interstate" and "intrastate." Without the implicit
third condition of full recovery of common costs under jurisdictional
separation, that intergovernmental process would tempt each regulator to
assert that the other was solely responsible for raising allowed rates in its
own jurisdiction to permit the recovery of the ILEC's common costs of
272network interconnection.
If it were not constrained-by the arbitrary and capricious standard of
the Administrative Procedure Act and by constitutional protections of
private property-the jurisdictional separations process could have the
practical effect of capping the price for service A below its stand-alone
cost by virtue of the insufficient amount of common costs jurisdictionally
allocated to that service. Meanwhile, the separations process could allocate
to service B a seemingly generous amount of common costs that would
imply a price exceeding the stand-alone cost of B; yet, being granted the
regulatory freedom to charge a price exceeding stand-alone cost would be
worthless to the ILEC, for the market already would constrain the ILEC to
win no sales at a price that exceeded the stand-alone cost of B. If such a
jurisdictional separation were not accompanied by an independent cost
recovery mechanism, the process of jurisdictional separations would
271 In re Jurisdictional Separations Reform and Referral to the Federal-State Joint Board, 12
F.C.C.R. 22,120, 19, at 22,131 (emphasis added) (1997) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) [hereinafter
Separations Notice].
272 Cf. Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 149 (1930) ("[P]roper regulation of rates
can be had only by maintaining the limits of state and federal jurisdiction" to determine whether
rates are confiscatory).
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become a shell game.273 As the name implies, common costs are common
to the overall activities of the ILEC. The arbitrary assignment of Xpercent
of those common costs to services regulated at the state level and Y percent
to services regulated at the federal level does not alter in any way the
essential commonality of those costs. Nor, in the event that confiscatory
rates deny the ILEC full recovery of its common costs of supplying
network access, should such a jurisdictional assignment of costs magically
limit the states' liability to Xpercent of the unrecovered common costs and
the FCC's liability to Y percent of the unrecovered common costs. The
ILEC should not be understood to compromise its right to full recovery of
its common costs of network access because state and federal regulators
happen to choose one allocation formula instead of another.
Currently, however, the law is not so clear, and regulatory practice not
so forthright, as this commonsense statement of first principles might
suggest. The FCC, for example, regards the separations process as a
safeguard against an ILEC's overrecovery of its costs: "One of the primary
purposes of this process is to prevent ILECs from recovering the same
costs in both the interstate and intrastate jurisdictions., 27 4 But the FCC
seems not to recognize that underrecovery of the common costs of
network access is just as serious a threat to consumer welfare.
This current gulf between first principles and established law creates
the potential for the process of jurisdictional separation to aid the CLECs'
strategy of raising rivals' costs through mandatory structural separation. If
jurisdictional separation of common costs has the effect of denying the
ILEC full recovery of the common costs that it prudently incurred to
supply access to the local telecommunications network, then the
jurisdictional separations rules will discourage new investment by the
ILEC in network assets that support economies of scope in the provision of
local telecommunications and that, consequently, are subject to that
separations process. Mandatory structural separation would predictably
affect precisely these assets of the ILEC.
Conclusion
The current debate over mandatory structural separation is only the
latest manifestation of the regulatory conflict that has existed between
AT&T and the regional Bell operating companies since long before
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996-indeed nearly since the
273 For a discussion of alternative cost recovery mechanisms, see SIDAK & SPULBER, supra
note 156, at 444-47.
274 Separations Notice, supra note 271, 3, at 22,122-23.
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effective date of the AT&T divestiture on January 1, 1984. The calls for
mandatory structural separation of the incumbent local exchange carriers
sound like the controversy de jour. For decades, the ILECs have faced
rate-of-return or price-cap regulation to prevent their exploitation of their
dominant positions in local exchange telecommunications. Next, the Bell
operating companies specifically were subjected to line-of-business
restrictions to prevent their exploitation of their dominant positions in local
exchange telecommunication. Then, the ILECs were subjected to
mandatory unbundling of their network elements at regulated prices to
prevent their exploitation of their dominant positions in local exchange
telecommunications. Now, AT&T and other CLECs insist that mandatory
structural separation of the ILECs is essential to prevent their exploitation
of their dominant positions in local exchange telecommunications. To
paraphrase T.S. Eliot, the calls for mandatory structural separation of the
ILECs "follow like a tedious argument of insidious intent., 275 In light of
the number and variety of policy instruments that legislators and their
expert regulators have used to pursue the common end of protecting
consumers of telecommunications services, one must question, if we are to
take the proponents of structural separation seriously, whether each of
those means to date has been a colossal failure (in which case, so might
also be mandatory structural separation). Alternatively, one must question
whether the actual, unstated purpose of those policy instruments has been
to pursue an entirely different objective of managing and handicapping
competitive outcomes to the satisfaction of legislators, regulators, and-
most importantly-interested companies (in which case, the imposition of
mandatory structural separation would justify similar cynicism).
Mandatory structural separation is unnecessary because the putative
benefits that it would produce are, in fact, nonexistent. Mandatory
structural separation cannot be necessary to increase competition in local
exchange services because regulators already (1) prohibit discrimination
by means of more direct but less-intrusive behavioral policies and (2)
regulate not only the ILEC's prices for end services sold to consumers, but
also its prices for UNEs and wholesale services sold to CLECs. Given this
multiple overlay of regulation, the ILECs surely cannot exercise market
power in the sale of end services to consumers or in the sale of inputs to
competitors. No malady exists for mandatory structural separation to cure.
Mandatory structural separation, however, would clearly impose
substantial costs on the ILECs. Because those costs are unnecessary to
275 T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in THE WASTE LAND AND OTHER POEMS
(1930).
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advance any public-interest objective, they are also social costs-a waste
of economic resources.
At the same time, the debate over mandatory structural separation
obscures three propositions that regulators, legislators, and courts cannot
ignore if they are to protect the interests of consumers. First, the many
failures of individual CLECs assuredly flow from defects in their own
business strategies, management, and financing rather than from violations
of antitrust law or the Telecommunications Act by the ILECs. Second,
although many CLECs have failed since 1996, the CLEC industry has
made substantial inroads into the market for local telecommunications,
and, thus, CLECs as a group have, as the FCC has documented, captured a
rapidly growing share of the local exchange market from the ILECs. Third,
quite apart from its ostensible purposes, mandatory structural separation of
the ILECs can facilitate a sophisticated and anticompetitive strategy of the
large CLECs (including AT&T) to raise the costs of their rivals, the
ILECs.
In short, mandatory structural separation of the ILECs is a non-
remedy for a non-problem. It would invite strategic abuse of the regulatory
process and obscure the self-evident proposition that every footrace must
have a winner and a loser. Regulators and legislators would better serve
the public interest by rejecting calls to mandate structural separation of the
ILECs.

